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Since the end of the Cold War, Asia has faced many traditional and non-traditional 
security challenges. These challenges include increasing Chinese assertiveness, territorial 
disputes among multiple Asian states in the East and South China Seas, the buildup of 
North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, the discovery of terrorist networks in Southeast Asia, and 
several major natural disasters and humanitarian crises. Each of these revealed an 
apparent lack of cooperation and coordination among countries in the region, but each 
seems to have spurred the creation or development of new regional institutions.  
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) initiated the formation of 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a cooperative security arrangement with the stated 
objectives to progress from confidence building measures to preventive diplomacy and 
conflict resolution. The usefulness of the ARF, however, continues to be hotly debated by 
analysts, who generally find the ARF to be limited in its ability to resolve Asia’s security 
challenges. These arguments, however, overlook the fact that the forum has fostered 
practical cooperation in addressing certain kinds of security challenges. What are the 
ARF’s limits in responding to Asia’s traditional and non-traditional security challenges?  
The thesis uses contemporary case studies to analyze the ARF’s limits. These case 
studies focus on the ARF’s responses to traditional and non-traditional security 
challenges. In so doing, the thesis recognizes that the ARF is unable to resolve traditional 
security issues or stage operational responses to non-traditional security issues. It argues, 
however, that the ARF is far from being irrelevant. The forum brought regional players 
together in constructive dialogues and fostered practical security cooperation in specific 
non-traditional security issues. 
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Since the end of the Cold War, Asia has faced many traditional and non-
traditional security challenges. These challenges include rising Chinese assertiveness, 
territorial disputes amongst multiple Asian states in the East and South China Seas, the 
buildup of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, the discovery of terrorist networks in Southeast 
Asia, and several major natural disasters and humanitarian crises. Each of these revealed 
an apparent lack of cooperation and coordination among countries in the region, but each 
seems to have spurred the creation or development of new regional institutions.  
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) initiated the formation of 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a cooperative security arrangement with the stated 
objectives to progress from confidence building measures (CBMs) to preventive 
diplomacy (PD) and conflict resolution (CR). The usefulness of the ARF, however, 
continues to be hotly debated by analysts, who generally find the ARF to be limited in its 
ability to resolve Asia’s security challenges. These arguments, however, overlook the fact 
that the forum has fostered practical cooperation in addressing certain kinds of security 
challenges. What are the ARF’s limits in responding to Asia’s traditional and non-
traditional security challenges?  
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Asia is a region characterized by traditional security challenges such as 
unresolved territorial disputes and potential security flashpoints. Unresolved sovereignty 
disputes include challenges with respect to the issue of Taiwan’s reunification with 
China, North Korea’s nuclear disarmament, the bilateral East China Sea disputes between 
China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and the overlapping South China Sea 
(SCS) territorial claims between multiple states. Potential security flashpoints include 
disputed border claims between Thailand and Cambodia, Myanmar and China, as well as 
India and Pakistan.  
From 2000, Asia has also been increasingly beset with non-traditional security 
challenges. The Bali bombing in 2002 by radical Islamic fundamentalists made ASEAN 
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leaders realize that terrorism was not an isolated problem for states in the west. Discovery 
of homegrown terrorist network operatives from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia, 
Singapore, and the Philippines reminded ASEAN states that terrorism is a clear and 
present threat in Asia. The region was also hit by a number of major natural disasters 
such as the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, Cyclone Nargis in 2008, and the more recent 
Typhoon Haiyan in 2013.  
Asia has seen the sprouting of numerous institutions in response to these security 
challenges. Aside from the ARF, other institutions and forums with security agendas and 
great powers membership include the East Asia Summit (EAS), Six-Party Talks, ASEAN 
Plus Three, Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD), ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting Plus 
(ADMM+), and the Shangri-La Dialogue. However, the ARF remains as Asia Pacific’s 
most inclusive security forum; its 27 members include all ASEAN states as well as extra-
regional and middle powers. It was conceived by ASEAN in 1994 as part of its 
“enmeshment and balance of influence strategy”1 to bring great powers together in a 
cooperative security arrangement.  
Notwithstanding its apparent inability to resolve traditional security conflicts and 
coordinate operational responses to non-traditional security challenges, the ARF has 
evolved from a dialogue-focused forum that only issues declarations, to one that has 
fostered significant practical cooperation in certain non-traditional security issues such as 
counter-terrorism and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). However, 
most observers overlook this cooperation, invoke unnecessarily stringent standards, and 
criticize the forum for its ineptness. By contrast, this thesis attempts to focus on these 
new forms of practical cooperation in order to provide an understanding of the ARF’s 
limits in its current institutional configuration and a basis for assessing whether the ARF 
could reasonably be expected to tackle specific security challenges in the region. The 
next section of this chapter critiques existing literatures and their binary assessments of 
1  Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies: Omni-Enmeshment, 
Balancing, and Hierachical Order,” RSIS Working Paper, Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 
Nanyang Technological University, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, July 2005, 4.  
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the ARF before providing a nuanced hypothesis that will be tested in the following 
chapters.    
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Existing literatures that analyzed the ARF can be broadly classified into works of 
either ARF critics or ARF advocates. Divergent views arose because critics and 
advocates held different interpretations for the forum’s objectives. Correspondingly, they 
used different criteria to measure the ARF’s effectiveness and limits, and these resulted in 
different assessments. Table 1 summarizes the differences.  
 3 
 Different interpretations, measurements, and assessments of the Table 1.  
ASEAN Regional Forum by ARF critics and ARF advocates 




The ARF is a regional security 
institution to resolve traditional 
security conflicts and conduct 
coordinated responses to non-
traditional security challenges. 
The ARF is a regional security 
institution to promote “ASEAN’s 
norms beyond Southeast Asia,”2 
“engage China in regional 
security dialogue,”3 and “manage 
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1. ARF Critics’ Complaints 
To ARF critics, the ARF was ineffective because it was not able to facilitate 
resolutions to traditional security issues or conduct coordinated operational responses 
towards non-traditional security issues. Critics emphasized the ARF’s inability to achieve 
its stated aims of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution.  
2  Noel M. Morada, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Origins and Evolution,” in Cooperative Security in 
the Asia-Pacific, eds. Jurgen Haacke and Noel M. Morada (New York: Routledge, 2010), 16. 
3 Ibid., 17. 
4 Ibid., 18. 
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a. Traditional Security Issues—Inability to Progress into Preventive 
Diplomacy 
On traditional security issues, ARF critics complained that the forum remained 
stagnated in the confidence-building phase. To the critics, the “failure or success of the 
ARF in its efforts to develop PD is a significant factor in future prospects for regional 
peace and stability.”5 Critics compared the ARF with collective security frameworks 
such as the European Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) and expected 
the ARF to enforce rules-based solutions to resolve traditional security conflicts. Critics 
argued that the ARF’s “failure to respond to regional crisis has dulled enthusiasm for the 
[forum].”6 In his article, Naidu opined that the ARF had not moved beyond the role of a 
“dialogue facilitator.”7 He argued that while the ARF had set itself up as a forum with 
ambitious agendas of PD and CR, it was unable to “show tangible progress”8 or 
“[address] the challenges it faced.”9 In the same vein, Emmers and Tan criticized the 
forum for its inability to advance PD efforts beyond “the mere denotation of an initiative 
to begin work on a PD work plan . . . whose implementation would . . . be voluntary and 
not legally binding.”10   
Critics offered at least three distinct reasons to explain why the ARF was not able 
to advance to PD. First, traditional explanations argued that it is not tenable to transpose 
the “ASEAN process”11 onto the ARF. In his 1997 article, Narine argued that the 
consensus modality was useful in fostering intra-regional cooperation amongst ASEAN 
states because the association’s weak states saw incentives to cooperate in an 
5  Ralf Emmers and Tan See Seng, “The ASEAN Regional Forum and Preventive Diplomacy: Built to 
Fail?” Asian Security 7, no. 1 (2011): 44. 
6  G. V. C. Naidu, “Multilateralism and Regional Security: Can the ASEAN Regional Forum Really 
Make a Difference?” Analysis from the East-West Center 45 (2000): 1.  
7  Ibid., 8. 
8  Ibid.  
9  Ibid. 
10  Emmers and See Seng, “ASEAN Regional Forum,” 45. 
11  Shaun Narine, “ASEAN and the ARF: The Limits of the ‘ASEAN Way,’” Asian Survey 37, no. 10 
(1997): 974.  
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“inhospitable environment.”12 ASEAN was able to alleviate inter-state tensions in 
Southeast Asia as they were bounded by conditions of external threat.13 In contrast, the 
“common external threat”14 condition was not applicable to the ARF’s strong state 
members. These states were more concerned in furthering their strategic interests in Asia. 
In addition, he argued that ASEAN did not have any “techniques to confront conflict 
directly.”15 In essence, Narine argued that the “ASEAN way’s”16 success in fostering 
security cooperation in the Southeast Asia sub-region occurred under a different context 
from that of Asia as a region. Application of the ASEAN way in the ARF would not yield 
the same successful outcomes.  
Second, some critics argued that the ARF’s ability to progress into PD and CR is 
contingent on the “participation levels and specific interests of powerful [member] 
states.”17 ARF member states’ divergent strategic outlooks had “complicated and even 
occasionally undermined [ASEAN’s] leadership of the ARF.”18 Jho and Chae argued that 
the ARF’s fluctuating ability in “improving territorial conflicts”19 depended on great 
powers’ interests in the region. The authors segmented the level of tension in the South 
China Sea territorial dispute to two distinct time periods. From 1997 to 2006, China 
pursued “expansionary goals”20 while the United States adopted “conservative goals”21 
in Asia. During this period, there was “temporary peace in the South China Sea”22 not 
because there was “active institutional agreement”23 within the ARF. Instead, it was 
12 Ibid., 973. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 974. 
16 Ibid., 976. 
17  Whasun Jho and Soo A. Chae, “Hegemonic Disputes and the Limits of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum,” Pacific Focus 29, no. 2 (2014): 254. 
18  Emmers and See Seng, “ASEAN Regional Forum,” 51. 
19  Jho and Chae, “Hegemonic Disputes,” 237. 
20 Ibid., 247. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid., 250. 
23 Ibid. 
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China’s “active participation strategy along with the United States’ passive acceptance of 
ARF”24 that kept tensions below simmering point. In contrast, from 2007 onwards, the 
United States and China’s competing strategic aims to further their pivotal interests and 
assert hegemonic influence in the region resulted in the ARF’s inability to reduce 
tensions.  
Third, critics claimed that the ARF could not progress beyond PD because the 
forum “over formalized its approach to PD.”25 Emmers and Tan argued that 
“sovereignty-based structures”26 and divergent strategic outlooks amongst member states 
did not prevent other Asian institutions such as the six party talks from adopting PD 
efforts. They argued that despite institutional similarities with the ARF, the Six-Party 
talks registered “intermittent successes”27 in talks pertaining to North Korea’s 
denuclearization. In the 2001 ARF meeting in Hanoi, the ARF agreed to the narrow 
definition of PD as “consensual diplomatic and political action taken by sovereign states 
with the consent of all directly involved parties.”28 This definition for PD, when taken 
together with the ARF’s sacrosanct principle of non-interference and member states’ 
predisposition for respect of states’ sovereignty, imposed self-limiting constraints on the 
forum’s ability to progress beyond PD. In short, the newly adopted state-centric 
definition of PD,29 which is “void of ambiguity and flexibility,”30 prevented 
implementation of initiatives that otherwise could have evolved under the loose definition 
of PD.  
24 Ibid. 
25  Emmers and See Seng, “ASEAN Regional Forum,” 56. 
26 Ibid., 51. 
27 Ibid., 48. 
28 Ibid., 55. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 56. 
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b. Non-traditional Security Issues—Failure of ARF to Mount Operational 
Responses in Counterterrorism and HADR 
On non-traditional security challenges, ARF critics argued that there was a lack of 
coordinated operational responses to issues such as counter-terrorism and HADR. They 
argued that instead of being coordinated through the forum, cooperation in these areas 
was led by the ARF’s “activist members”31 and was predominantly “bilateral and extra-
regional.”32  
Critics highlighted the ARF’s limitations in counter-terrorism cooperation. David 
Martin Jones argued that “ASEAN norms have not enhanced regional counterterrorism 
cooperation.”33 He attributed the limited information and intelligence exchanges to 
mutual suspicion between states and argued that the bilateral nature of cooperation 
between ASEAN states and the United States acted to “impair the development of more 
solid regional networks required of a security community.”34 In the same vein, Victor 
Cha argued that instead of the ARF, it was the strong bilateral alliance network between 
the United States and Asia–Pacific states that enabled counterterrorism cooperation in the 
region. Cha attributed success of the U.S.-led multilateral Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI) in disrupting the illicit trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
other terrorism-related paraphernalia to strong bilateral relations between the United 
States and coalition states.35 Similarly, Haacke argued that there had been little progress 
in the ARF beyond discussing and ratifying counterterrorism agreements. He criticized 
the ARF’s lack of specific timelines for implementing concrete counterterrorism 
initiatives. With the exception of “one desktop exercise relevant to counterterrorism,”36 
31  Jurgen Haacke, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: From Dialogue to Practical Security Cooperation?” 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22, no. 3 (2009): 446.  
32  David Martin Jones and M. L. R. Smith, “Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving 
East Asian Regional Order,” International Security 32, no. 1 (2007): 174. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35  Victor D. Cha, “Complex Patchworks: U.S. Alliances as Part of Asia’s Regional Architecture,” 
Asia Policy 11 (January 2011): 43. 
36  Haacke, “ASEAN Regional Forum: From Dialogue to Practical Security Cooperation?,” 434. 
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Haacke noted that the ARF had not managed to facilitate any “practical counterterrorism 
activities.”37 
Critics also argued that the ARF was not able to coordinate operational HADR 
responses. In his article, Cha criticized the ARF for its inability to formulate a regional 
coordinated response during the 2004 tsunami. Instead, he credited the “makeshift 
coalition of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—known as the Tsunami Core 
Group” (TCG)38 for its effectiveness. The TCG was formed within 48 hours of the crisis 
and delivered critical aid to the worst hit areas in Indonesia.39 Similarly, while Haacke 
recognized ARF efforts to push for practical HADR cooperation, he argued that states’ 
sensitivities and concerns on security and sovereignty infringements with regards to the 
stationing of foreign troops in affected areas impeded the scope and extent of relief effort 
coordination.40  
c. ARF Critics’ Arguments—Selective Interpretation and Analysis of the 
ARF’s Relevance 
Critics’ arguments focused on what the ARF had not been able to achieve; they 
neglected the forum’s achievements. While critics’ complaints about the ARF’s inability 
to progress beyond CBMs in tackling traditional security challenges are valid since the 
forum did make PD and CR its stated objectives, it is premature to dismiss the forum as 
ineffective or irrelevant. After all, the 20-year-old ARF is a young institution compared 
to established security institutions such as the OSCE, which was formed in 1973. To this 
end, critics failed to acknowledge the forum’s increased willingness to foster practical 
security cooperation in non-traditional security issues. Notwithstanding the lack of 
coordinated operational responses to counterterrorism and HADR, the increased 
frequency and scope of workshops and field exercises conducted under ARF’s auspice 
indicates member states’ affinity towards practical cooperation in these areas. 
Significantly, critics’ arguments do not explain why ARF member states continue to 
37 Ibid. 
38  Cha, “Complex Patchworks,” 37.  
39 Ibid., 41. 
40  Haacke, “ASEAN Regional Forum: From Dialogue to Practical Security Cooperation?,” 446. 
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participate in the forum despite its limited utilities. The ARF may not have progressed 
beyond CBMs but it has definitely evolved from a talk shop to engage in practical forms 
of security cooperation. 
2. ARF Advocates’ Defense of the ARF 
While it is true that the ARF had not been able to progress into PD, much less CR 
in traditional security issues, and the forum was unable to coordinate responses to counter 
terrorism and deliver aids to disaster areas, it did not mean that the ARF was a mere 
dialogue facilitator that could not move beyond declarations. To this end, advocates 
argued that the ARF’s success in “shaping regional norms” and developing practical 
security cooperation offered good reasons for member states to continue participating in 
the forum.  
ARF advocates argued that the forum was not designed as a securitized institution 
to resolve traditional security challenges and execute operational responses to non-
traditional security issues. Advocates generally associate the ARF’s functional utility 
with “cooperative security” frameworks.41 To the advocates, the ARF’s utility should be 
measured by its ability to foster “regional collective identity”42 and shape states’ 
behavior to align with regional norms according to the “ASEAN way.”43 They argued 
that the forum was effective as a “reassurance vehicle”44 and acted as a “norms 
brewery.”45  
On non-traditional security issues, advocates recognized the ARF’s limitations in 
staging coordinated operational responses but they also accorded credits to the forum’s 
evolution towards practical cooperation. Significantly, advocates highlighted the ARF’s 
progress from dialogues and declarations to conducting tabletop and simulation exercises, 
41 Jurgen Haacke and Noel M. Morada, “The ASEAN Regional Forum and Cooperative Security: 
Introduction,” in Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific, eds. Jurgen Haacke and Noel M. Morada (New 
York: Routledge, 2010), 2–3. 
42 Tobias Nischalke, “Does ASEAN Measure Up? Post Cold War Diplomacy and the Idea of Regional 
Community,” Pacific Review 15, no. 1 (2002): 89. 
43 Ibid. 
44  Haacke and Morada, “ASEAN Regional Forum,” 2. 
45 Ibid. 
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and field exercises. In short, advocates focused on what the ARF can achieve or has 
achieved. To the advocates, the ARF’s inability to resolve conflicts and coordinate 
operational responses does not render the forum irrelevant.   
a. Traditional Security Issues—Shaping Regional Norms through the 
ASEAN Way 
Advocates emphasized the relevance of the ARF in shaping regional norms. They 
differentiated the ARF’s cooperative security modality with the OSCE’s collective 
security framework and argued that unlike the OSCE, the ARF is a forum that “reflects 
the convergence of strategic interests of both the regional and external actors.”46 Heller 
argued that the ARF increased the “appeal of security cooperation”47 and “facilitated 
common perceptions.”48 In the same vein, Acharya opined that the ARF’s “normative 
regionalism”49 was able to “engage, enmesh, and ensconce”50 major powers because its 
emphasis on “ideational variables such as ideas, norms, and identity”51 are non-
threatening as compared to “materialist variables such as relative gains and balance of 
power.”52 
Instead of adopting legalistic rule-based frameworks, the ARF based its principles 
on the non-intrusive “ASEAN way”53 to foster voluntary cooperation. The “ASEAN 
way”54 stressed “social construction of perceptions and actions”55 and emphasized the 
46  Dominik Heller, “The Relevance of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for Regional Security in 
the Asia-Pacific,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 27, no. 1 
(2005): 123. 
47 Ibid., 133–5. 
48 Ibid., 136–7. 
49 Amitav Acharya and Allan Layug, “Collective Identity Formation in Asian Regionalism: ASEAN 
Identity and the Construction of the Asia-Pacific Regional Order,” paper presented at the meeting of the 




53  Heller, “Relevance of the ASEAN,” 135. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 136. 
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“importance of a positive atmosphere and shared norms.”56 The ARF operated under the 
principles of ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which professes 
adherence to specific behavioral norms. Members are socialized to choose cooperation 
over defection because the latter would be detrimental to their reputation. The promise of 
frequent meetings also allowed information sharing between member states to enhance 
transparency in the region.  
To the advocates, the ARF functioned as an intermediary forum where member 
states established networks of cooperation. Member states that needed to iron out 
contentious security issues could meet on the sidelines of the forum. To this end, the 
ARF’s cooperative security mechanism had led to the sprouting of other security forums 
such as the Shangri-La Dialogue and the ADMM+, which further reinforced networking 
amongst key defense officials and resulted in the virtuous spiral of increased practical 
cooperation in security. In this light, the ARF contributed in PD efforts by bringing 
members together and facilitating “cross checking and . . . reevaluation of negative 
attitudes and prejudices among members within the ARF.”57 The forum was able to 
foster a common value where member states believed in the importance of regional 
stability for continued economic development.58  
Advocates also argued that the ARF’s continued relevance in shaping regional 
norms hinges on the forum’s inclusive membership. By agreeing that the ARF should 
move at a pace that is “not too fast for those who want to go slow, and not too slow for 
those who want to go fast,”59 the forum had been able to cater to states’ different 
preferences. In fact, some advocates argued against “deeper institutionalization”60 as that 
will negate the ARF’s “advantage of rendering participation attractive for all 
members.”61 To advocates, some states like China continue to stay engaged in the forum 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 136. 
58 Ibid., 137. 
59 ASEAN Regional Forum, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper,” paper presented at the 
ASEAN Regional Forum, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, August 1, 1995.  
60  Heller, “Relevance of the ASEAN,” 140. 
61 Ibid. 
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not because they expect the forum to resolve conflicts. Instead, to these states, the ARF 
“functions like an insurance policy”62—states only need to assume “modest transaction 
costs”63 in furthering their interests in the international stage. 
In sum, advocates based their arguments largely on the constructivist framework 
and opined that the ARF functioned as a forum to foster cooperation through the shaping 
of regional norms. While these arguments were theoretically sound, advocates offered 
little evidence to prove the existence of a regional norm in the tackling of traditional 
security issues. The forum continued to be divided between activists and reluctant states, 
with the former urging for deepening of institutions and the latter reluctant to progress 
beyond CBMs.  
b. Non-traditional Security Issues—Practical Cooperation in Counter-
Terrorism and HADR  
In the area of non-traditional security, however, ARF advocates have provided 
limited evidence of the forum’s increased willingness to engage in practical security 
cooperation. To this end, the ARF’s conduct of a significant number of workshops on 
counter-terrorism, and related exercises on maritime security in which counterterrorism 
was featured as a main component, indicated consensus amongst member states on the 
importance of transnational cooperation in tackling terrorism. In 2002 alone, the ARF 
conducted three separate workshops with related agendas.64 These workshops called for 
the “development of a check-list of potential areas of ARF cooperation”65 and the 
“enhancement of existing networks of law enforcement and pertinent security agencies to 
enhance information and intelligence exchange.”66 Relatedly, the forum’s Inter-Sessional 
Meetings on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crimes (ISMs on CT-TC) also 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., 135. 
64  Noel M. Morada, “The ASEAN Regional Forum and Counter-Terrorism,” in Cooperative Security 




                                                 
deliberated extensively and “reached a degree of consensus”67 for ARF-centered 
multilateral cooperation in counter-terrorism.  
The ARF also conducted a significant number of maritime security tabletop and 
sea exercises. In 2005, Singapore and the United States co-hosted an ARF maritime 
security workshop to “develop concrete ‘solution sets’”68 to maritime security 
challenges, where counter-terrorism constituted a significant component. The workshop 
resulted in agreements for the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to act as an 
intermediary for “information sharing, personnel training, capacity building, and 
technical cooperation.”69 While there was no extension of maritime security cooperation 
to include joint operations, several participants supported the expansion of maritime 
security cooperation under the Five Powers Defense Arrangements (FPDA) and Western 
Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS).70 In 2007, Singapore also organized an ARF 
maritime security exercise that involved 21 ARF participants. The exercise served as an 
operational confidence building measure (CBM) to facilitate professional exchanges in 
tabletop and simulation exercises. ARF participants agreed on the prospect of the CBM to 
progress into sea exercises but cautioned that these exercises would need to be “carefully 
studied and consulted between and among concerned countries, with the view of 
achieving consensus.”71  
Amongst the non-traditional security issues, practical cooperation in HADR 
achieved the most headway. To mitigate concerns on infringement of sovereignty, ARF 
members agreed to develop the ARF Strategic Guidance for HADR. In 2008, Indonesia 
and Australia organized the ARF Disaster Relief tabletop exercise at the Naval Command 
and Staff College in Jakarta. The exercise provided insights to improve civil–military 
coordination and promoted understanding between ARF participants on the need for 
67 Ibid., 167. 
68  Jurgen Haacke, “The ASEAN Regional Forum and Transnational Challenges: Little Collective 
Securitization, Some Practical Cooperation,” in Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific, eds. Jurgen 
Haacke and Noel M. Morada (New York: Routledge, 2010). 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., 142. 
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coordinated multinational responses during disasters. In 2009, the United States and 
Philippines co-organized the voluntary demonstration response (VDR). The VDR was the 
first HADR field exercise under ARF’s auspice and included tabletop exercises and 
practical cooperation in areas such as maritime search and rescue, medical assistance, and 
engineering and construction work.72 Under the ARF’s Inter-Sessional Meeting on 
Disaster Relief (ISM-DR), ministers also agreed to work on concrete initiatives to 
improve “ARF-wide or sub-regional training for disaster relief” and to develop an ARF 
humanitarian assistance military and civil defense assets template.73 In 2011, Japan and 
Indonesia cohosted the inaugural ARF Disaster Relief Exercise (DiREx) in Manado, 
Indonesia, where ARF members collaborated with seven other international organizations 
in a series of tabletop and field exercises.74 The DiREx has since been conducted 
annually, with Malaysia and China slated to co-organize the 2015 exercise in Kedah, 
Malaysia.   
c. ARF Advocates’ Arguments—Insufficient Evidence to Prove the 
Existence of Regional Norms in Traditional Security Issues  
Advocates argued that the ARF’s shaping of regional norms would provide the 
foundation for the forum’s subsequent progress into PD and CR. They were, however, 
unable to provide concrete evidence for the existence and practice of regional norms in 
states’ approaches towards traditional security challenges. Advocates also failed to relate 
the increased practical cooperation, and moderate shifts in member states’ affinity 
towards greater cooperation in tackling non-traditional security challenges, to the forum’s 
ability to tackle specific regional security challenges. While cooperation in these areas 
remained limited and fell short of operational responses, they indicated member states’ 
willingness to progress beyond dialogues and declarations.   
72 Ibid., 144–5. 
73 Ibid., 145. 
74  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report: ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief 
Exercise (ARF DiREx) 2011,” Report presented at the ASEAN Regional Forum, Manado, Indonesia, 
March 15–19, 2011. 
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3. Arguments Resembling a Glass that is Nearly Empty or Half Full  
Arguments by ARF critics and advocates resembled a glass that is nearly empty 
or half full. Critics complained that the ARF was ineffective because it was not able to 
fulfill its stated objectives—to progress into PD and resolve regional Asia’s security 
challenges. Advocates argued that the ARF fostered regional norms but were not able to 
substantiate their claims with concrete examples. Both the critics and the advocates failed 
to recognize the importance or explain the significance for the ARF’s evolution towards 
practical cooperation in non-traditional security challenges. Existing literature does not 
explain why the ARF was able to foster practical security cooperation in certain security 
issues such as HADR and counterterrorism, but faced strong headwind in other 
challenges such as territorial disputes. The following section offers plausible hypotheses 
for this phenomenon.  
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
In formulating the hypothesis, two assumptions are made. The first assumption is 
that the ARF would continue to be ASEAN-led. It follows then that the forum would 
continue to adopt the “ASEAN way”75 where adherence to principles of non-interference 
in member states’ domestic affairs and non-use of force remains sacrosanct. Second, it 
remains implausible for Asia to see a hegemonic regional order in the near future. 
Correspondingly, the ARF would have to work within the constraints of member states’ 
different preferences. Consensus and alignment of all member states’ interests would be 
necessary before the forum could see progress beyond dialogues and declarations.  
In framing the question to ask not about the effectiveness but the limits of the 
ARF, the thesis avoids making subjective measurements and assessments of the forum’s 
effectiveness furthered by either ARF critics or advocates. Instead, the thesis aims to 
identify the conditions that need to be fulfilled for the forum to advance security issues 
beyond dialogue and declarations.  
75  Heller, “Relevance of the ASEAN,” 135. 
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Since the ARF is ASEAN-led and based on consensus, if any of the ASEAN core 
principles are infringed or ARF members’ interests (critically, great powers’ interests) are 
not aligned in the security issue to be tackled, then the forum would not be able to 
progress beyond dialogues and declarations. Since traditional security issues such as the 
South China Sea maritime territorial dispute are likely to infringe on ASEAN’s core 
principles and are typically zero-sum in that one state’s gain is another state’s loss, it is 
unlikely that there would be congruence amongst member states on ARF measures to 
resolve disputes or conflicts there.  
If, however, ASEAN core principles are not infringed and ARF members’ 
interests (critically, great powers’ interests) are aligned in tackling security issues, then 
the forum may be able to progress beyond dialogues and declarations towards practical 
security cooperation.  Non-traditional security issues, such as counterterrorism and 
HADR, are not zero-sum. Notwithstanding some member states’ unease over the idea of 
trans-boundary military deployments, these issues also generally do not infringe 
ASEAN’s core principles and are aligned with ARF members’ interests. A concerted 
approach towards counterterrorism boosts regional security, and HADR exercises 
contribute to confidence-building efforts. The ARF, therefore, was able to progress 
beyond dialogues and declarations towards practical security cooperation in these issues.  
The thesis recognizes that the ARF is unable to resolve traditional security issues 
or stage operational responses to non-traditional security issues. It argues, however, that 
the ARF is far from being irrelevant. The forum brought regional players together in 
constructive dialogues, shaped regional norms, and fostered practical security 
cooperation in specific non-traditional security issues.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The thesis uses contemporary case studies to analyze the ARF’s limits. These case 
studies focus on the ARF’s responses to traditional and non-traditional security 
challenges. The thesis focuses first on traditional security issues because these issues are 
most likely to infringe ASEAN’s principles for preservation of sovereignty rights and 
prohibition of the use of force. Chapter II examines the ARF’s role, or lack thereof, in 
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restraining states from the use of force in the South China Sea (SCS) territorial disputes. 
The SCS case study is chosen because it is an example of a zero-sum territorial conflict 
that involves multiple ARF member states. Correspondingly, it is unlikely that the 
condition for consensus amongst ARF members would be fulfilled. In so doing, the thesis 
argues that it is unrealistic to expect the ARF to resolve such conflicts because unlike the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the forum is not designed to resolve territorial 
disputes.  
On non-traditional security issues, the thesis selected two main areas—
counterterrorism and HADR—where the ASEAN principles for non-intrusion of 
sovereignty rights and prohibition of the use of force are arguably preserved. Progress in 
practical cooperation, however, was not uniform in these areas. The thesis explains the 
different paces by arguing that cooperation mechanisms pertaining to counter-terrorism 
were more sensitive compared to HADR. Consequently, practical cooperation in HADR 
was able to make further headway compared to counter-terrorism.    
Essentially, the thesis tests the hypothesis against contemporary case studies. It 
argues against the proposition that the ARF should be expected to resolve traditional 
regional conflicts and conduct coordinated responses to non-traditional security 
challenges. Despite the ARF’s limitations, the case studies provide evidence for the 
ARF’s relevance as the bedrock to shape regional norms amongst regional and extra-
regional state players, and foster practical security cooperation in non-traditional security 
challenges.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW  
The thesis is organized into four chapters. The introduction chapter initiates 
readers to the research question and importance of the thesis before presenting 
contemporary discourses on the effectiveness and limits of the ARF. Subsequently, 
plausible hypotheses to the research question are laid out with the intended research 
design.  
Through the case studies in Chapters II and III, the thesis establishes the ARF’s 
limits and argues that assessments of the ARF’s functional utility should not be confused 
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by comparing it with institutions adopting OCSE-type securitization. Chapter II utilizes 
the South China Sea maritime territorial disputes case study to analyze the ARF’s limits 
in brokering states’ differences in traditional security matters. Chapter III, in turn, 
examines the ARF’s abilities to foster practical cooperation in non-traditional security 
issues such as counter-terrorism and HADR. The last chapter provides a nuanced 
argument that in tackling regional security challenges, the ARF’s limits are contingent on 
whether the forum would be able to fulfill the two conditions laid out in the proposed 
hypothesis. Only when these conditions are met would the ARF be able to progress 
security issues beyond dialogue and declarations.   
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II. LIMITS OF THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM IN 
MANAGING THE SOUTH CHINA SEA MARITIME DISPUTE 
While Asia has seen collective responses in reacting to and resolving a number of 
traditional security challenges such as the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and 
delimitation of the Sino-Vietnamese land and maritime border, it is still beset with 
numerous unresolved traditional security challenges.  
Traditional security challenges are state-centric issues that typically involve 
states’ sovereignty. These challenges include intra-state and inter-state conflicts. Intra-
state conflicts include political struggles between domestic factions while inter-state 
conflicts span across disagreements over the delimitation of land and maritime borders. 
Many states in Asia remain entangled in land and maritime border disputes. Parties to 
inter-state disputes over legitimacy to rule include China and Taiwan, India and Pakistan, 
and the two Koreas. Inter-state disagreements over the delineation of shared land borders 
include those between China and its neighbors, Myanmar and India, as well as between 
Cambodia and Thailand.  
On the maritime front, seven Asian states claim sovereignty over the South China 
Sea’s Spratly and Paracel islands and the waters surrounding these islands. From the late 
2000s, China’s increasingly assertive actions raised tensions in the region and renewed 
attention from claimants and external powers on the dispute. After being kept off the 
ASEAN Regional Forum’s (ARF) agenda for the last two decades, concerned states 
raised the issue for discussion in the forum from 2010. The ARF, however, exhibited 
limited utilities in the management of the SCS maritime dispute. What are the reasons for 
the ARF’s limitations in managing and/or resolving traditional security challenges in the 
region such as the SCS maritime dispute? The first part of this chapter traces the events 
that characterized the different levels of tensions in distinct periods throughout the 
dispute and outlines the ARF’s responses, or lack thereof, in responding to these events. 
The second part analyzes the ARF’s limitations through the framework offered in the 
preceding chapter, and attributes the forum’s limited utility to two key factors—the need 
to maintain the “ASEAN way” of non-interference and consensus, and the need for 
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alignment in member states’ interests. Throughout the dispute, the ARF was not able to 
progress beyond dialogue and declarations because the “ASEAN way” limits member 
states from intervening in states’ actions; member states’ divergent interests in the SCS 
also contributed to the forum’s inability to agree on measures to manage the dispute. The 
last part analyzes evidences of apparent socialization of states towards regional norms, 
argues that these happened outside the ARF’s ambit, and questions the ARF’s utility as 
an intermediary forum to resolve traditional security challenges such as the SCS dispute.    
A. PERIODS WITH DIFFERENT LEVELS OF TENSION AND THE ARF’S 
RESPONSES 
The different levels of tension in the South China Sea can be broadly segmented 
into three time periods. First, the dispute saw heightened tension from the 1970s to early 
2000s, with claimants asserting sovereignty rights over various island features. This was 
followed by a period of brief respite till the late 2000s. During this period, the dispute 
was generally contained; in 2002, ASEAN and China concluded the Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DOC). Tension in the SCS, however, flared again from 
the late 2000s when various claimant states undertook actions to reassert claims. This 
section traces the ARF’s responses during the separate periods.    
1. Heightened Tension Period from 1970s to Early 2000s and ARF’s 
Formation 
The three decades from 1970 to the early 2000s witnessed numerous inter-state 
skirmishes, of which China was a party to almost every encounter. In 1974, China ousted 
Vietnamese forces from the Paracel Islands’ Crescent Group and took control of the 
entire Paracels. Sino-Vietnamese conflict again erupted over the Spratly Islands’ Johnson 
South Reef in 1988; China took control and occupied the reef thereafter. In 1994 and 
1995, China’s construction of structures on the Spratly’s Mischief Reef that was also 
claimed by the Philippines sparked diplomatic protests by the latter state. The Philippines 
responded to China’s expansionary claims by running the BRP Sierra Madre aground on 
Second Thomas Shoal in 1999. China reacted to Philippines’ act with the issuance of 
diplomatic protests and asked for the removal of the Sierra Madre. A dozen Filipino 
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marines remain stationed onboard the ship, which serves the purpose of a quasi-military 
outpost. In 2001, a United States EP-3 intelligence plane overflying its mission in the 
SCS was intercepted by and collided with a Chinese J8 fighter jet. China asserts that 
UNCLOS precludes military operations such as the EP-3 mission within its Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) in the SCS.   
The ARF was set up in 1994 amidst calls by regional and extra-regional states for 
a security institution in Asia to tackle traditional security issues such as the SCS maritime 
dispute. The forum had ambitious stated objectives to engage in confidence-building 
measures (CBMs), preventive diplomacy (PD), and conflict resolution (CR). Its 
responses to events related to the SCS dispute were, however, meek to say the least. 
During this period, China vehemently opposed the inclusion of the SCS maritime dispute 
in the ARF’s agenda. China was wary that internationalizing the dispute would allow the 
smaller ASEAN state claimants to gain “international sympathy”76 from extra-regional 
states, “draw the United States and Japan more directly into the dispute,”77 and provide 
reasons for external powers to implement containment policies against itself. Operating 
as an inclusive forum, the ARF acceded to China’s request to keep the issue outside of 
the ARF’s meeting agenda. Consequently, the ARF did not proceed beyond the issuance 
of one-paragraph Chairman’s Statements noting “some ARF countries’ concerns that 
there could be increased tensions,”78 asking for “countries concerned to seek solutions by 
peaceful means,”79 and encouraging the “exercise of self-restraint by all countries.”80  
76  Craig A. Snyder, “Security in the South China Sea,” The Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy 
Studies 3 (March 2011): 4. 
77 Ibid. 
78  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Chairman’s Statement of the 6th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum,” Singapore, July 26, 1999. 
79  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Chairman’s Statement for the 3rd Meeting of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum,” Jakarta, July 23, 1996. 
80  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Chairman’s Statement of the 7th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum” (Bangkok, ASEAN Regional Forum, July 27, 2000). 
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2. Period of Brief Respite and ARF’s Inactions 
The early 2000s saw a period of brief respite from tensions. Until the late 2000s, 
the maritime dispute was contained; claimants refrained from escalatory actions in the 
disputed waters. In 2002, ASEAN and China concluded the DOC. It should be noted, 
however, that discussions on the DOC were conducted between ASEAN and China, and 
were outside the ARF’s auspices. During this period, the SCS dispute continued to be 
kept off ARF’s agenda and the forum continued to issue generic Chairman’s Statements 
to recognize progress made in the DOC and to welcome “establishment of the ASEAN-
China Working Group that would oversee the implementation of the Declaration.”81 The 
ARF continued to play no part in managing the dispute.  
3. Renewed Tension and Limited Rhetoric in ARF Statements  
Clashes and tension in the SCS resumed in the late 2000s. While most claimant 
states at some point in time took actions to assert claims, many of the escalatory events 
during this period involved China and are arguably related to China’s increased assertion 
of sovereignty rights. In 2009, the ocean surveillance ship, USNS Impeccable, reported 
harassment by Chinese ships while performing a survey in the SCS. The same year, 
Malaysia’s Prime Minister visited Swallow Reef in support of his country’s claim to the 
feature. In 2011, Chinese patrol ships deliberately cut off Vietnamese survey vessels’ 
cables while the latter vessels were conducting underwater survey in disputed waters. 
Chinese surveillance vessels were also involved in a separate standoff with a Philippine 
warship in Scarborough Shoal in 2012. Following the standoff, China deployed its coast 
guard ships to block the Philippines from conducting logistic and personnel transfers to 
the BRP Sierra Madre. In 2013, the Philippines sought formal recourse through the 
United Nations, asking the international body to establish an arbitral tribunal under 
UNCLOS to hear the dispute.82 More recently, in May 2014, China deployed 
governmental vessels to escort an oilrig to conduct unilateral exploration in disputed 
81  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Chairman’s Statement of the 12th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum” (Vientiane, ASEAN Regional Forum, July 29, 2005).  
82  Carlyle A. Thayer, “New Commitment to a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea” (Seattle, WA: 
The National Bureau of Asian Research Commentary, October 9, 2013), 2.  
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waters off the Paracels.83 While the operation was subsequently called off in July 2014, 
the unilateral exploration escalated tension and resulted in a number of incidents 
involving collisions between Chinese and Vietnamese ships.84 In August 2014, while 
performing its mission in the SCS, an American P-8 Poseidon also escaped a near mid-air 
collision after a Chinese fighter jet intercepted it at close distance.85  
Despite the heightened tension during this period of time, the ARF’s responses 
remained subdued. Notably, while China had been successful at keeping discussion of the 
SCS dispute out of previous ARF meetings, its increasing assertiveness in the late 2000s 
prompted 12 member states, which included the United States and all ASEAN claimants, 
to “raise concerns about China’s increasingly assertive actions in the SCS”86 at the 17th 
ARF in 2010.  
In discussing ways to manage the SCS territorial dispute, tension flared between 
China and these member states. In the meeting, then U.S. secretary of state, Hillary 
Clinton, stated that “the United States, like every other nation, has a national interest in 
the freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for 
international law in the SCS.”87 The United States’ statement explicitly supported 
ASEAN’s bid to progress with discussions to implement the DOC to prevent further 
escalatory actions. These member states’ collective stance was, however, seen by China 
as an orchestrated move by the United States to interfere with its rightful sovereignty 
claims. In response, China warned members “against encouraging United States 
involvement”88 and insisted that the dispute should be addressed bilaterally with 
respective claimants. Consequently, the lack of consensus amongst ARF members meant 
83  Jianwei Li, “China, Vietnam, and the Paracels: Time for a Way Out?” RSIS Commentaries, no. 118 
(June 24, 2014).   
84 Ibid. 
85  Ryan Santicola, “Responding to China’s Air Intercept,” Diplomat, August 27, 2014, 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/responding-to-chinas-air-intercept/  
86  Ian Storey, “China’s Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy in the South China Sea,” in Cooperation 
from Strength: The United States, China, and the South China Sea, ed. Patrick M. Cronin (Washington, 
DC: Center for a New American Security, January 2012), 57.  
87  David Scott, “Conflict Irresolution in the South China Sea,” Asian Survey 52, no. 6 (November/
December 2012): 1002.  
88  Storey, “China’s Bilateral,” 57. 
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that the forum was unable to move beyond the mere issuance of statement to “[stress] the 
importance of maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea.”89 The SCS 
dispute had been discussed in subsequent meetings but the forum remained unable to 
progress beyond its routine issuance of statements to stress the “importance of peaceful 
settlement of disputes through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states 
directly concerned,”90 and encourage the “full and effective implementation of the DOC 
and substantive consultations for [the] Code of Conduct in the South China Sea 
(COC).”91  
B. REASONS FOR THE ARF’S LIMITATIONS 
The intent of the preceding section is not to provide a detailed chronological 
rundown of skirmishes related to the SCS dispute. These events, and the ARF’s 
responses, however, provide the basis to assess the forum’s limitations in managing 
traditional security issues such as the SCS dispute. The “ASEAN way” modality adopted 
in the ARF had been criticized as ineffective in managing the territorial dispute because 
of its proclivity to adhere strictly to the principles of non-interference and consensus. 
Operating on the basis of the lowest common denominator, the forum is reluctant to 
intercede in the dispute without unanimous agreements from member states. To this end, 
divergent interests and policies between the United States and China, as well as 
ASEAN’s own disunity owing to Southeast Asian states’ conflicting interests, 
contributed to the forum’s inability to progress beyond the issuance of non-binding 
statements.  
1. Strict Adherence to the “ASEAN Way”  
The “ASEAN way” advocates non-interference in other states’ internal affairs. 
The SCS maritime territorial dispute is a complex multi-state dispute that encompasses 
89  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Chairman’s Statement for the 17th ASEAN Regional Forum” (Hanoi, 
Vietnam, ASEAN Regional Forum, July 23, 2010). 
90  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Chairman’s Statement of the 20th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum” (Bandar Seri Begawan, July 2, 2013). 
91  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Chairman’s Statement of the 21st Meeting of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum” (Nay Pyi Taw, ASEAN Regional Forum, Aug 10, 2014). 
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claims of varying degree by seven Asian states—China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim all 
islets in the Spratly and Paracel chains; Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines claim 
sovereignty rights over specific islands in the Spratly group. Indonesia’s exclusive 
economic zone owing from the Natuna Islands archipelago also overlaps with China’s 
nine-dash line (NDL) claims. As with all other territorial disputes, the SCS dispute is 
zero-sum in that one state’s gain would be another state’s loss. The ARF could not 
intercede in states moves to assert sovereignty over the disputed islands because that 
would infringe on the principle of non-interference.  
a. Non-interference in State Actions 
The ARF’s upholding of the non-interference principle is evident from the lack of 
responses to claimant states’ actions to assert sovereignty. As noted in the earlier section, 
many of the confrontations in the SCS stemmed from states’ bids to consolidate control 
of the islands and waters surrounding these islands. As highlighted in the preceding 
section, China was a party to many of the confrontations in the dispute. It remains 
arguable, however, whether China’s actions would be more appropriately categorized as 
that of a provocateur or respondent to other claimants’ actions. Regardless, threatened by 
China’s seemingly increasing assertiveness, many claimant states felt the need for 
commensurate responses; states adopted actions to consolidate sovereignty over islands 
under their control. These actions included Vietnam’s construction of naval facilities in 
Bombay Castle in 1995, Malaysia’s occupation of the disputed Erica Reef and 
Investigator Shoal in 1999, and its announcement of intentions to build an airstrip and 
tourist resort on Swallow Reef in 2009, as well as the aforementioned Philippines 
grounding of BRP Sierra Madre on the Second Thomas Shoal in 1999.92 In 2009, 
Malaysia and Vietnam also submitted joint claims to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS). Following its 2011 proposal to the International Tribunal of 
the Law of the Sea for international arbitration,93 the Philippines sought formal recourse 
92  Samuel Sharpe, “An ASEAN Way to Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia?” Pacific Review 16, 
no. 2 (2003): 240. 
93  Storey, “China’s Bilateral,” 57, 61.  
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through the United Nations in 2013.94 Through these events, the ARF continued to issue 
generic statements that encourage claimants to “exercise ‘self-restraint’ and to promote 
confidence building.”95 The forum was reluctant to dissuade claimant states from altering 
the status quo because that would contravene the principle of non-interference in 
members’ internal affairs.  
b. No Consensus on Multilateralism or Bilateralism  
The complexity of the SCS dispute as a maritime dispute that involves multiple 
state claimants and the increased complications accorded with the need to delineate 
maritime boundaries meant that it is extremely challenging, if not impossible, for states to 
reach consensus on measures to manage the dispute. Specifically, member states’ 
different preferences for multilateralism or bilateralism contributed to the forum’s 
inability to manage the dispute. Most ARF members, including ASEAN claimants and 
non-claimant states, which are concerned with the freedom of navigation in the SCS, 
including the United States, preferred multilateral discussions. China, however, preferred 
bilateral negotiations amongst claimant states outside the ARF.  
The United States’ explicit support for multilateral security arrangements such as 
the ARF to “check ambitions of individual players”96 in the SCS runs counter to China’s 
preference for bilateral negotiations. In maintaining neutrality, the United States had 
asked states to clarify the extent and basis of their claims and encouraged the early 
conclusion of a binding COC as that would allow freedom of navigation and continued 
access to the SCS. By stating in the 17th ARF in 2010 that “legitimate claims to maritime 
space in the SCS should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features,”97 the 
94  Thayer, “New Commitment,” 2.  
95  J. N. Mak, “Maritime Security and the ARF: Why the Focus on Dialogue rather than Action?” in 
Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific, eds. Jurgen Haacke and Noel M. Morada (New York: Routledge, 
2010), 196. 
96  Patrick M. Cronin and Robert D. Kaplan, “Cooperation from Strength: U.S. Strategy and the South 
China Sea,” in Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China, and the South China Sea, ed. Patrick 
M. Cronin (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, January 2012), 10.  
97  M. Taylor Fravel, “U.S. Policy Towards the Disputes in the South China Sea since 1995” (policy 
report, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 
March 2014), 5. 
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United States implicitly opposed the basis of China’s unilateral NDL claims and 
Vietnam’s historical claims.98 In stating “support for a “collaborative diplomatic process 
by all claimants,’”99 the United States also alluded to a preference for multilateral 
discussions in forums such as the ARF, in contrast with China’s affinity for bilateral 
negotiations. 
China had consistently resisted tabling the SCS dispute for discussion in the ARF 
or other international forums and organizations. In 1999, Malaysia joined China in 
blocking the Philippines’ attempt to internationalize discussions of the SCS dispute in the 
6th ARF meeting.100 The ASEAN claimant, however, subsequently acceded to ASEAN’s 
collective negotiations with China. In 2006, China also declared to the UN secretary 
general that “it would not accept any international court of arbitration in disputes over sea 
delimitation, territorial disputes, and military activities.”101 In the same vein, China 
objected to the earlier mentioned joint Malaysia–Vietnam claims to the CLCS in 2009. 
During the 16th ARF meeting in 2009, China again opposed inclusion of the SCS dispute 
for discussion, stating that it was “not an issue for ASEAN, that [the dispute] involved 
only the coastal states, and that China intended to resolve the dispute through bilateral 
and not multilateral negotiations.”102  
In 2010, China agreed to discussions with ASEAN to implement the DOC so as to 
deter these states from forming closer alliances with the United States. This did not mean 
that China was relenting to multilateral discussion of the issue. In 2010, when the United 
States signaled its support and willingness to facilitate multilateral negotiations to 
conclude the COC, China objected vigorously and stated that “if the issue is turned into 
an international or multilateral one, it will only make matters worse.”103 Wary of the 
United States’ intentions in promoting multilateral diplomacy on the SCS dispute, China 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
100  Mak, “Maritime Security and the ARF,” 196. 
101  Scott, “Conflict Irresolution,” 1022.                     
102  Leszek Buszynski, “Rising Tensions in the South China Sea: Prospects for a Resolution of the 
Issue,” Security Challenges 6, no. 2 (Winter 2010): 94. 
103  Scott, “Conflict Irresolution,” 1023. 
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conducted dialogues with ASEAN to avoid alienating the association’s member states. 
China remained “adamantly opposed”104 to Secretary Clinton’s suggestions in 2010 to 
involve the United States in DOC discussions and has repeatedly warned Vietnam and 
the Philippines “against encouraging U.S. involvement.”105 In addition, China rejected 
the Philippines’ 2011 proposal to the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea for 
international arbitration106 and refused to acknowledge the Philippines’ seeking of formal 
recourse through the UN in 2013. In addition, China sets an unhurried pace in 
negotiations, stating that talk of a quick fix  . . . is an attitude neither realistic nor 
serious.”107 Commenting on the approach for discussions, China highlighted that it 
would adopt principles such as “consensus through negotiations,”108 “elimination of 
interference,”109 and a “step by step approach.”110 This signals China’s continued 
reluctance to conclude binding agreements on the SCS with ASEAN in the near future. 
The forum’s adherence to the principle of consensus based on the lowest common 
denominator meant that collective agreement from all member states would be required 
to implement dispute management measures. While the ASEAN–China DOC in itself is a 
significant milestone, it took place outside the ARF’s auspices. The non-binding nature of 
the declaration also meant that it had limited utility in constraining Chinese actions. 
Significantly, the ARF’s member states could not reach consensus on the mode for 
dispute management in the SCS. As a result, the ARF was unable to function beyond a 
talk shop. 
104  Storey, “China’s Bilateral,” 57. 
105 Ibid.  
106 Ibid., 57, 61.  
107  Carlyle A. Thayer, “ASEAN, China, and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea,” SAIS 
Review of International Affairs 33, no. 2 (2013): 81.  
108 Ibid., 82.  
109 Ibid.  
110 Ibid.  
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2. Divergent Interests and Policies between the United States and China  
The United States’ pivot to Asia policy in 2009, its categorization of the SCS as a 
core interest in the 2010 ARF meeting, and its strengthened defense relationships with 
ASEAN claimants elevated China’s suspicion that the United States was seeking a 
containment policy against it. Consequently, China opposed multilateral discussions in 
the ARF because it was wary that ASEAN claimants would leverage external powers to 
assert pressure against its claims. 
a. The United States’ Concern for Freedom of Navigation versus China’s 
Strategic Interests in the SCS   
The United States had consistently stated in official communications that it does 
not take sides in the SCS dispute. The United States is interested in maintaining freedom 
of navigation and overflight in the SCS for strategic reasons. Connecting the Western 
Pacific to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East, the SCS is a waterway that is critical for 
United States’ global redeployment of forces from the Pacific to theaters in the Middle 
East and Africa. Continued access to the SCS and naval primacy is also a pivotal 
requisite for the United States to maintain its hegemonic influence in the region. In 
addition, some $1.2 trillion in U.S. trade transits through the SCS annually.111  
In asserting “indisputable sovereignty over the seas, islands, and their 
surrounding waters,”112 China claims all of the SCS through its NDL map. China’s main 
interests are access to maritime resources and “sea-lane security.”113 Aside from the rich 
marine life and corresponding importance to the fishery industry, Chinese sources also 
labeled the SCS as “the second Persian Gulf,”114 claiming that it would “ultimately yield 
130 billion barrels of oil or more.”115 In addition, the SCS is a strategic waterway to 
China as it is for the United States. Ships carrying about 80% of China’s energy needs 
transit the SCS and connecting seaways; China’s import of raw materials and export of 
111  Cronin and Kaplan, “Cooperation from Strength,” 7. 
112  Storey, “China’s Bilateral,” 57. 
113 Ibid., 53.  
114  Cronin and Kaplan, “Cooperation from Strength,” 9. 
115 Ibid. 
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finished products to international markets depends on continued access to the SCS. To 
China, this constitutes a “strategic vulnerability”116 and necessitates development of 
strategies to assert greater control over the SCS’s Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs). 
To this end, China’s extensive claims and the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLA 
Navy) fleet modernization worked in tandem with its strategy of “anti-access and area-
denial”117 to assure control of the vital waterways.   
b. The United States’ Policy of “Active Neutrality”118  and China’s 
Strategy of “Non-Assertive Confrontation”119  
The United States adopts a policy of “active neutrality”120 towards the SCS 
dispute. In response to rising Chinese assertiveness, the United States’ announced its 
pivot to Asia strategy in 2009, and substantiated it with increased military deployments, 
including forward deployment of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and a 2,500-strong 
Marines detachment in Singapore and Australia, respectively. More recently, following 
Secretary Hagel’s strongly worded address in the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue that the 
United States “would not look the other way when fundamental principles of the 
international order are being challenged,”121 it announced in October 2014 the plan for 
forward deployment of two additional missile destroyers with the Navy’s latest ballistic 
missile defense (BMD) systems to Japan by 2017. In addition, the U.S. Army reported 
that it would redeploy troops from Central Command to the Pacific Command and 
indicated an estimated 60% increase in forces assigned to the region.122  
116  Storey, “China’s Bilateral,” 54. 
117  Cronin and Kaplan, “Cooperation from Strength,” 9. 
118  Mingjiang Li, “The Changing Contexts of China’s Policy on the South China Sea Disputes,” First 
Manila Conference on the South China Sea: Toward a Region of Peace, Cooperation, and Progress, Manila, 
Philippines, July 5–6, 2011, 201. 
119 Ibid., 199. 
120 Ibid. 
121  Chuck Hagel, “The United States’ Contribution to Regional Security,” presentation at the Shangri-
La Dialogue 2014, 13th Asia Security Summit, Singapore, May 31, 2014, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/
shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/2014-c20c/plenary-1-d1ba/chuck-hagel-a9cb.     
122  Gary Sheftick, “Soldiers Shifting to Pacific Via New ‘Pathway,’” United States Army, October 
14, 2014, http://www.army.mil/article/136129/Soldiers_shifting_to_Pacific_via_new__pathway_/.  
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The United States also strengthened its bilateral defense relations with claimant 
states such as Vietnam and the Philippines to signal its resolve to deter China from 
making further assertions in the SCS. With Vietnam, the United States concluded the 
Memorandum of Understanding on Advancing Bilateral Defense Cooperation in 2011. 
Subsequently, the two states had conducted naval exchanges and exercises on an annual 
basis.123 In 2011, the United States concluded a sales deal with the Philippines for a 
refurbished Hamilton-class coast guard cutter to boost the Philippine navy’s fledging 
capabilities.124 In the 2011 signing of the Manila Declaration,125 the United States also 
announced that it “will always be in the corner of the Philippines [and] will always stand 
and fight with [the Philippines]”126 More recently in December 2013, the United States 
promised a program to develop the Philippines’s maritime domain awareness with US$40 
million funding.127 The United States’ increased force posturing and strengthened 
alliances played to Chinese fears that the United States intended to “play a direct role in 
the [SCS] dispute.”128  
To China, the significant force reassignment to Asia and strengthened alliances 
with rival claimant states signaled United States’ intent to maintain “military 
preponderance in the SCS . . . to contain or constrain China’s rise.”129 In response, China 
adopted policies of “non-confrontational assertiveness.”130 China understands that its 
current military capabilities still lag those of the United States and does not want to 
engage in confrontational actions that would draw the United States into the SCS dispute. 
This, however, does not mean it is willing to relent on its claims. Despite repeated calls to 
clarify the extent of its claims, China prefers to leave the interpretation of its NDL claims 
ambiguous. Official statements consistently assert that “China has indisputable 
123  Fravel, “U.S. Policy Towards the Disputes,” 8. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid., 9.  
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid., 6. 
129  Li, “Changing Contexts,” 201. 
130 Ibid., 199. 
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sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and adjacent waters”131 but falls short of 
delimiting the boundaries.  
To support its assertions of sovereignty, China mounted a number of exercises on 
a significant scale. In 2009, China conducted large-scale military exercises in the SCS 
involving the airborne refueling of its J-10 fighter planes.132 In 2010, China conducted a 
long-distance naval exercise that saw the deployment of North Sea Fleet assets to the 
SCS “to protect its maritime territorial integrity through long-distance naval 
projection.”133 Separately, China also organized a “large scale live-ammunition 
exercise”134 in the SCS that “involved China’s most advanced vessels from all three 
fleets.”135 In so doing, China is sending a deterrence signal to remind rival claimants that 
despite increased U.S. commitments in the region and renewed defense relationships, it 
remains determined to defend its claims of the SCS islands and surrounding waters as a 
core interest.  
Clashes between U.S. and Chinese interests and policies in the SCS make it 
nearly impossible to include the SCS dispute as an issue for deliberation in the ARF. 
Mutual suspicions between the two great powers mean that one state’s actions are seen as 
countervailing the other’s—the United States saw China’s increased assertion of controls 
and restricted access of U.S. military activities in the SCS as detrimental to its interests, 
while China perceived United States’ involvement in the SCS dispute and increased 
deployment to the Pacific as a containment strategy against itself. The ARF operates on 
the basis of the lowest common denominator; divergent interests amongst the two great 
powers made it implausible for the forum to establish mutually agreeable positions to 
address the SCS dispute in a substantial manner.  
131  M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A 
Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 33, no. 3 (December 2011): 294;  Storey, “China’s Bilateral,” 
59.              
132  Li, “Changing Contexts,” 203. 




                                                 
3. ASEAN Disunity—ASEAN’s Concern for Regional Stability, Intra-
Association Disunity, and Limited Collective Actions in the ARF  
While ASEAN demonstrated a general willingness to manage the SCS maritime 
territorial dispute collectively on the basis that security instability would negatively 
impact the region’s economy, opinions on the legal status of the SCS islands remained 
divided amongst states in the association.136 Each of the ASEAN claimants had “as much 
of a dispute with other ASEAN claimants as they have with China,”137 making it 
extremely challenging to formulate a common ASEAN position in the ARF. 
In addition, while professing support for a common “ASEAN spirit”138 in 
furthering multilateral approach to dispute management in the SCS, each ASEAN 
claimant state had engaged in separate bilateral discussions with China. Some analysts 
had warned that bilateral discussions with China played into Chinese strategy to “divide 
[ASEAN states] and clobber [ASEAN states] one by one.”139 ASEAN states, however, 
continued bilateral negotiations because they were dissatisfied with the lack of progress 
in multilateral engagements. To this end, the Philippines concluded a joint seismic 
exploration agreement with China in 2004 that allowed state oil companies to conduct 
joint survey in disputed waters.140 While the agreement was later expanded in 2005 to 
include Vietnam, it can be argued that ASEAN states’ bilateral approach to conclude 
agreements with China had the effect of undermining the association’s unity in 
addressing the issue collectively with China.141 ASEAN claimants’ tendency to take 
unilateral actions in pursuing legitimacy over the disputed waters further exacerbated 
ASEAN disunity. The earlier mentioned Malaysia–Vietnam joint submission to the 
CLCS in 2009, and the Philippines’ seeking of formal recourse through the UN in 2013 
without formal consultation with the association are further evidence of ASEAN disunity 
in managing the SCS dispute. 
136  Snyder, “Security in the South China Sea,” 7. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid., 8. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid., 10–11. 
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Further, not all ASEAN member states are parties to the maritime dispute. Non-
claimant states such as Singapore and Thailand are principally concerned with regional 
stability and advocated for “maintaining a balance of power supported by an active U.S. 
military presence.”142 Other non-claimant states such as Cambodia displayed inclinations 
towards China. In 2012, Cambodia, as ASEAN’s rotating chair, refused to endorse the 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting’s (AMM) draft statements that incorporated Vietnam and 
the Philippines’ objections to Chinese activities in the SCS’s disputed waters.143 
Cambodia echoed China’s stand that the SCS disputes were bilateral and should be kept 
off AMM’s joint communiqué. It was not until Indonesia’s conduct of shuttle diplomacy 
to broker agreement amongst states that the chair finally released ASEAN’s six-point 
principles on the SCS.144  
In sum, even though ASEAN displayed increased unity from late 2010 in pursuit 
of a multilateral approach with China to implement the DOC, discussions were kept 
outside of the ARF, between ASEAN and China. The association’s member states also 
continued to maintain bilateral negotiations with China; ASEAN states did not see 
multilateral engagements in the ARF as a critical means of managing the SCS dispute.  
142  Amitav Acharya, “ASEAN’s Dilemma: Courting Washington without Hurting Beijing,” Asia 
Pacific Bulletin, no. 133 (October 18, 2011).  
143  Thayer, “ASEAN, China, and the Code,” 78. 
144 Ibid., 79. 
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III. LIMITS OF THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM IN 
FOSTERING PRACTICAL SECURITY COOPERATION IN 
COUNTER-TERRORISM AND HUMANITARIAN DISASTER 
RELIEF 
Traditional security threats typically involve state actors during intra-state or 
inter-state conflicts. By contrast, non-traditional security (NTS) challenges emanate from 
“a host of transnational threats to human well-being and state capacity.”145 NTS 
challenges in Asia ranged from trans-boundary crimes such as illegal smuggling across 
land and maritime frontiers, terrorism, insurgencies, and natural disasters. Responding to 
these challenges, the ARF set up various Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISMs) to discuss and 
foster regional cooperation to tackle the various NTS challenges. Different initiatives in 
the form of workshops and exercises were also conducted to enhance practical 
cooperation in these areas. The first part of this chapter recalls events that triggered the 
ARF’s decision to cooperate in counter-terrorism and HADR, and highlights the different 
scope of initiatives in the two NTS domains. The second part then tests the hypothesis 
proposed in Chapter I through analysis of the ARF’s limited practical cooperation to 
tackle NTS challenges, and argues that while member states’ interests were aligned in the 
NTS areas of counter-terrorism and HADR, practical cooperation fell short of 
coordinated operational responses because of states’ reluctance to cede principles of non-
interference, and concerns on the infringement of sovereignty rights. The last part of this 
chapter highlights bilateral and multilateral coordination outside of the ARF’s auspices in 
recent counter-terrorism coordination and disaster relief efforts, and concludes that, 
despite encouraging progress made by the forum to tackle these NTS challenges, 
operational cooperation under the ARF’s banner remained limited.   
 
145  Alan Collins, “Non-Traditional Security,” in Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism, eds. 
Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs (New York: Routledge, 2012), 313. 
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A. BACKGROUND TO ASIA’S NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY 
CONCERNS AND THE ARF’S RESPONSES 
The ARF states’ realization of the importance of cooperation in counter-terrorism 
and HADR was triggered by two events, the 2002 Bali bombing and the 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami, respectively. Following the catastrophic September 11 terrorist attacks in 
the United States, the forum condemned terrorist atrocities during meetings and issued 
statements that “emphasized [the] need for the ARF to find ways and means to cooperate 
further in the fight against terrorism.”146 Subsequently, the discovery of terrorist cells in 
Southeast Asia and the 2002 Bali bombing internationalized the United States’ campaign 
against terrorism; the United States categorized the region as the “second front”147 to 
counter terrorism. Separately, the lack of coordinated responses to the devastating Indian 
Ocean tsunami in 2004 brought the importance of regional HADR cooperation to the fore 
of the forum’s agenda. Even though Asia as a region had a high occurrence of natural 
calamities, including earthquakes, tsunamis, and floods, there was no region-wide HADR 
cooperative framework to deliver aid and render assistance to disaster-struck areas.  
B. THE ARF’S PRACTICAL COOPERATION IN COUNTER-TERRORISM 
AND HADR 
The ARF embarked on separate initiatives to foster practical cooperation in 
counter-terrorism and HADR. Evidently, the scope for cooperation in counter-terrorism 
and HADR were quite different: counter-terrorism cooperation only progressed from the 
issuance of joint declarations to workshops and seminars; by contrast, the ARF has 
undertaken practical cooperation in HADR, such as tabletop exercises (TTXs) and field 
training exercises (FTXs). The reasons for the disparity in scope will be discussed in the 
second part of the chapter. The rest of this section outlines activities conducted under the 
ARF’s auspices in the two NTS domains.  
146  Morada, “ASEAN Regional Forum and Counter-Terrorism,” 152. 
147 Ibid. 
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1. Limited Practical Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism 
The ARF initiated the formation of the ISM on counter-terrorism and 
transnational crime (ISM-CTTC) in 2003 to discuss avenues for counter-terrorism 
cooperation. The ISM-CTTC’s scope included a broad range of issues outside of counter-
terrorism such as illicit drug smuggling and human trafficking. To this end, the ISMs 
fostered consensus on the need to “recognize the multidimensional nature of terrorism 
including its links with transnational crimes”148 and to work on “practical, action-
oriented, and concrete”149 actions to counter the threats of terrorism. In 2006, the ARF 
ISM-CTTC declared that to complement enforcement cooperation, it was also necessary 
to emphasize a “people-centered approach to counter terrorism.”150 This theme was 
highlighted subsequently in every ISM-CTTC, including the 2009 ISM-CTTC, in which 
members “recognized the urgency to implement a ‘soft’ approach” and noted 
“recommendations to [promote] inter-faith and inter-cultural dialogue, [promote] human 
rights, intelligence exchanges and information sharing, [expand] inter-governmental 
networks and [strengthen] police, judicial, and extradition cooperation.”151 Subsequent 
ISM-CTTC also issued statements indicating the need for more “comprehensive and 
multifaceted strategies.”152 Despite the strongly worded rhetoric and statements, practical 
cooperation under the ARF did not progress further than the organization of counter-
terrorism training workshops and limited intelligence and information sharing. Table 2 
recaps the counter-terrorism workshops and seminars conducted by the ARF.  
148 Ibid., 167. 
149 Ibid. 
150  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Fifth ASEAN Regional Forum 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime” (Singapore, ASEAN Regional 
Forum, May 2–4, 2007). 
151  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Seventh ASEAN Regional Forum 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime” (Hanoi, Vietnam, ASEAN 
Regional Forum, May 4–7, 2009). 
152  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Eighth ASEAN Regional Forum 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime” (Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, 
ASEAN Regional Forum, Apr 28–30, 2010).; ASEAN Regional Forum, “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of 
the Ninth ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational 
Crime” (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, ASEAN Regional Forum, May 29–31, 2011). 
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 Counter-terrorism workshops and seminars conducted under ARF Table 2.  
auspices153 
Practical Cooperation in Counter-terrorism under ARF 
Year Workshops and Seminars Exercises 
2014 - ARF Workshop on Cyber Confidence Building Measures in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; 
co-chaired by Australia, Russia, and Malaysia 
 
2013 - ARF Workshop on Measures to Enhance Cyber Security—Legal and Cultural Aspects in 
Beijing, China; co-chaired by China and Malaysia 
- ARF Workshop on Countering Radicalization in Tokyo, Japan; co-chaired by Japan and 
Malaysia 
 
2012 - ARF Workshop on Preparedness and Response to a Biological Event in Manila, 
Philippines; co-chaired by Australia, the Philippines, and the United States 
- ARF Workshop on Proxy Actors in Cyberspace in Quang Nam, Vietnam; co-chaired by 
Vietnam and the United States 
- ARF Workshop on Cyber Incident Response in Singapore; co-chaired by Australia and 
Singapore 
- ARF Seminar on Confidence-Building Measures in Cyberspace in Seoul, Korea; co-
chaired by Republic of Korea and Malaysia 
 
2010 - ARF Cybercrime Capacity-Building Conference in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei; co-
chaired by United States and Vietnam 
 
2008 - ARF Conference on Terrorism and the Internet in Bali, Indonesia; co-chaired by 
Australia and Indonesia 
 








2006 - ARF Seminar on Cyber Terrorism in New Delhi, India  
2005 - ARF Seminar on Cyber Terrorism in Cebu, Philippines; co-chaired by Korea and the 
Philippines 
 
2004 - ARF Seminar on Cyber Terrorism in Jeju Island, Korea; co-chaired by Korea and the 
Philippines 
 
2003 - ARF CBM Workshop on Managing Consequences of a Major Terrorist Attack in 
Darwin, Australia; co-organized by Australia and Singapore 
 
2002 - ARF Workshop on Financial Measures Against Terrorism in Honolulu, United States; 
co-organized by Malaysia and the United States 
- ARF Workshop on Prevention of Terrorism in Bangkok, Thailand; co-organized by 
Australia and Thailand 
- ARF Workshop on Counter-terrorism in Tokyo, Japan; organized by Japan 
 
* The ARF Maritime Security Shore Exercise (MARISX) 2007 is not strictly a counter-terrorist exercise per se. Its 
focus was on a range of maritime security–related challenges, where counter-terrorism was featured as a component. 
 
The ARF workshops and seminars initially focused on two main areas: capacity 
building, and intelligence and information sharing. In 2002 and 2003, four separate 
counter-terrorism workshops were conducted under the forum’s banner. These workshops 
addressed different focal areas including measures to cut off financing for terrorist 
153 Information provided in the ASEAN Regional Forum official website.  
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organizations, plausible responses to terrorist threats that can be taken at the national, 
bilateral, and multilateral level, and lessons learnt from terrorist attacks. All of the 
workshops recommended the “enhancement of existing networks of law enforcement”154 
and called for “further information and intelligence exchange[s].”155 There was, 
however, conspicuous absence in follow-ups to effect concrete counter-terrorism 
cooperation.  
Following the workshops held in 2002 and 2003, all but one workshop focused on cyber 
security and cyber terrorism. It is significant to note that these workshops, like the ones 
conducted earlier, did not generate any new initiatives or agreements to enhance practical 
cooperation on counter-terrorism. While workshops such as the 2008 ARF conference on 
terrorism and the Internet in Bali, Indonesia, co-organized by Australia and Indonesia did 
recommend “the use of existing training centers in ARF participating countries for trainings on 
countering terrorist use of the Internet,”156 there have been no actual follow ups to the initiative. 
Similarly, calls from the Republic of Korea to “examine the possibilities of constructing a 
Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERTs) network within the framework of the ARF . . . to 
minimize the damaging effects of cyber terrorism through information exchange and technical 
support”157 during the 2004 ARF Seminar on cyber terrorism did not see further progress.158 In 
addition, despite the aforementioned emphasis on “multifaceted strategies”159 to “[deepen] 
cooperation among the relevant law enforcement agencies in countering terrorism within the 
region and [promote] interfaith and intercultural dialogue,”160 there were no ARF workshops or 
initiatives organized on these specific areas. This calls to question whether there was synergy 
between the ISM-CTTC and organizers of the various workshops. The lack of a concerted 
154  Morada, “ASEAN Regional Forum and Counter-Terrorism,” 162. 
155 Ibid. 
156  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report for ASEAN Regional Forum Conference 
on Terrorist use of the Internet” (Bali, Indonesia, ASEAN Regional Forum, Nov 6–8, 2008, l). 
157  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Co-Chairs’ Summary of the First ARF Seminar on Cyber Terrorism” 
(Jeju Island, Republic of Korea, ASEAN Regional Forum, Oct 13–15, 2004). 
158 By contrast, ASEAN states collaborated activities amongst the ASEAN CERTs and conducted 
drills such as the ASEAN CERTS Incident Drills (ACID). 
159  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Ninth ASEAN Regional Forum 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime” (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 
ASEAN Regional Forum, May 29–31, 2011). 
160 Ibid. 
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thematic focus in the various workshops calls into question whether these activities were 
organized for the mere sake of maintaining cooperation tempo under the forum’s auspices.  
2. Practical Cooperation in HADR 
The ARF formed a separate ISM to discuss HADR-related issues. The ISM for 
search and rescue coordination and cooperation in 1996 was subsequently renamed as the 
ISM for Disaster Relief (ISM-DR) in 1997, reflecting the meeting’s intent to expand 
previous scope for search and rescue (SAR) to include more generally, disaster relief 
matters outside of SAR. Suspended in 2000 because of member states’ differences over 
the cross-border deployment of militaries for relief efforts, the ISM-DR resumed 
following the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004.161 Since then, the ISM-DR has 
held annual meetings to stock take and discuss practical cooperation in HADR. 
Practical cooperation in HADR under the ARF’s auspices included workshops 
and seminars, TTXs, and more recently, FTXs (see Table 3 for the summarized list of 
HADR activities organized under ARF’s ambit). Significantly, HADR cooperation 
progressed beyond workshops and seminars with the conduct of ARF’s inaugural desktop 
exercise on disaster relief in 2008. Held in Jakarta, Indonesia, and co-organized by 
Australia and Indonesia, the exercise was aimed at enhancing interoperability between 
ARF member states in disaster relief operations.162 Member states practiced the draft 
ARF standard operating procedure (SOP) for HADR, which was subsequently developed 
into the ARF strategic guidance for HADR. This was followed with the voluntary 
demonstration of response (VDR) in 2009, co-organized by the United States and 
Philippines. Conducted in Luzon, Philippines, the VDR saw the participation of 26 ARF 
member states and involved assets from 14 participating states.163 During the VDR, 
Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) coordinated with the Philippines Coast 
161  Haacke, “ASEAN Regional Forum and Transnational Challenges,” 142. 
162  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Eighth ASEAN Regional Forum 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief” (Banda Aceh, Indonesia, ASEAN Regional Forum, Dec 5–6, 
2008). 
163  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report for ASEAN Regional Forum Voluntary 
Demonstration of Response (ARF-VDR)” (Luzon, The Philippines, ASEAN Regional Forum, May 4–8, 
2009). 
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Guard and Navy in the deployment of a JMSDF search-and-rescue short takeoff and 
landing (STOL) Shin Maywa US-2 plane to exercise the SAR of injured survivors on a 
vessel in Manila Bay. Other participants of the VDR also deployed medical and 
engineering capabilities. The VDR signified a “major step for ARF in developing 
concrete and tangible”164 practical cooperation in HADR and encouraged the 




                                                 
 HADR workshops, seminars, and exercises conducted under ARF Table 3.  
auspices165 
Practical Cooperation in HADR under ARF 
Year Workshops and Seminars Tabletop exercises (TTX) Field Exercises 
2014 - ARF Workshop on Consular 
Contingency Planning and Crisis 
Management in Bali, Indonesia; co-
chaired by Australia and Indonesia 
  
2013  - ARF DiREx 2013 in Cha-am, 
Phetchaburi Province, Thailand; 
co-organized by Thailand and 
Korea 
- ARF DiREx 2013 in Cha-am, 
Phetchaburi Province, Thailand; 
co-organized by Thailand and 
Korea 
2012 - ARF Seminar on the Laws and 
Regulations of Disaster Relief in 
Beijing 2012, China; co-chaired by 
Indonesia, China, and the United 
States 
  
2011  - ARF DiREx 2011 in Manado, 
Indonesia; co-organized by 
Japan and Indonesia 
- ARF DiREx 2011 in Manado, 
Indonesia; co-organized by 
Japan and Indonesia  
2010 - ARF Seminar on the Laws and 
Regulations of Disaster Relief 2010 
in Beijing, China; co-chaired by 
China, and Thailand 
- ARF Training Workshop on 
developing a common framework for 
post disaster needs assessment, 
recovery and reconstruction in Asia in 
Bangkok; co-chaired by EU and 
Thailand 
  
2009 - ARF Seminar on the Laws and 
Regulations of Disaster Relief in 
Beijing 2009, China; co-chaired by 
China, and Singapore 
 - ARF VDR 2009 in Luzon, 
Philippines; co-organized by the 
United States and Philippines 
2008 - ARF Seminar on Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Issues in Bangkok, 
Thailand; organized by the United 
States 
- ARF Desktop Exercise on 
Disaster Relief in Jakarta, 
Indonesia; organized by 
Australia and Indonesia 
 
2005 - ARF workshop on Civil Military 
Operations in Manila, Philippines; co-
organized by Australia and the 
Philippines 
  
2002 - Humanitarian Assistance and 
Disaster Relief Seminar in Singapore; 
organized by Singapore 
- Combined Humanitarian Assistance 
Response Training (CHART) in 
Singapore;  
  
2000 - ARF Train the Trainers Seminar 
“Towards Common Approaches to 
Training in Disaster Relief” in 
Bangkok, Thailand; organized by 
Thailand 
  
165 Information provided in the ASEAN Regional Forum official website.  
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Following member states’ acknowledgement of the VDR’s utility in promoting 
HADR coordination, the ARF ISM-DR endorsed recommendations for regular disaster 
relief exercises (DiREx). In 2011, Japan and Indonesia co-organized the ARF DiREx in 
Manado, Indonesia. DiREx 2011 occurred under the backdrop of the 2011 Japanese 
earthquake and tsunami—the actual exercise took place three days after the calamity. 
Consequently, DiREx 2011 saw reduced participation from United States and Japan but 
witnessed the participation of 25 ARF member states and civil organizations such as the 
UNICEF, UNOCHA, WFP, WHO, and IFRC. The three-component DiREx 2011, which 
included a TTX, FTX, and a humanitarian civil action (HCA) component, saw increased 
exchanges between participants. The HCA saw deployment of medical teams from 
China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Timor-Leste, and the European Union (EU) 
in the provision of free medical services in Indonesian villages. The medical teams were 
also deployed onboard a floating hospital onboard the TNI AL’s hospital ship, KRI 
Soeharso. Significantly, the FTX also saw coordination of military assets from 
participants, including ships and boats from the Indonesian and Indian navies, and 
helicopters from Indonesia, India, and Singapore.166  
The endeavor towards greater practical cooperation in HADR continued in 2013, 
with the conduct of DiREx 2013 in Phetchaburi province, Thailand. Co-organized by 
Korea and Thailand, the exercise saw the participation of 24 ARF member states. In 
DiREx 2013, MERCY Malaysia and the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, which is an 
international organization comprising of China, Japan, and South Korea, and designed to 
promote peace and common prosperity, also joined civil organization participants who 
had participated in the previous DiREx. DiREx 2013 also saw increased deployment of 
military assets from participants in the FTX, including “ships and boats from Thailand, 
the ROK, and the United States, helicopters from Thailand, and transport aircrafts from 
Thailand, Japan, Malaysia, ROK, and Singapore.”167 Civil organizations such as the 
UOCHA, IFRC, and WHO also contributed “other types of assets such as medical, 
166  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief 
Exercise (ARF DiREx) 2011” (Manado, Indonesia, ASEAN Regional Forum, Mar 15–19, 2011). 
167  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster 
Relief Exercise (ARF DiREx) 2013” (Cha-am, Thailand, ASEAN Regional Forum, May 7–11, 2013). 
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communications, canine, and SAR equipment.”168 Aside from the increased participation 
of physical assets, the FTX also saw the exercising of more systematic HADR 
coordination, with the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) set up to act as the main 
coordinating body to synchronize deployment of ASEAN and non-ASEAN civilian and 
military assets. The EOC coordinated with the ASEAN Coordinating Center for 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Management (AHA Center) for deployment of 
ASEAN civil–military assets, with the On-Site Operations and Coordination Center 
(OSOCC) for non-ASEAN civilian assets, and the Civil–Military Operations Center 
(CMOC) for non-ASEAN military assets.169 While this seemed like a cumbersome 
hierarchical structure, ARF member states’ willingness to exercise the structure 
symbolized significant shifts to plausible greater practical cooperation in HADR.  
Overall, the ARF ISM-DR’s efforts to foster greater practical cooperation in 
HADR have been encouraging. In 2009, ARF members endorsed the joint Australia and 
Singapore proposal to implement the ARF disaster relief mapping service initiative.170 
The Internet-based geospatial disaster relief mapping service was subsequently 
operationalized in mid-2010. ARF participants were encouraged to “input data on a 
voluntary basis, in coordination with Australian Department of Defense.”171 In the 2012 
ISM-DR, Australia highlighted that “the service had been utilized to an extent during the 
Christchurch earthquake in 2011.”172   
Plans for DiREx 2015 also moved towards more comprehensive exercising of 
inter-state civil–military coordination in HADR. Updating members on preparations, co-
168 Ibid. 
169  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Co-Chair’s Summary Report ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief 
Exercise (ARF DiREx 2013) Final Planning Conference (FPC)” (Cha-am, Thailand, ASEAN Regional 
Forum, Apr 1–3, 2013). 
170  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Ninth ASEAN Regional Forum 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief” (Honolulu, Hawaii, United States, ASEAN Regional Forum, 
Sep 16–18, 2009). 
171  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Tenth ASEAN Regional Forum 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief” (Bangkok, Thailand, ASEAN Regional Forum, Sep 2–3, 2010). 
172  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Eleventh ASEAN Regional Forum 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief” (Brisbane, Australia, ASEAN Regional Forum, Apr 16–17, 
2012). 
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organizers China and Malaysia stated that the exercise aims to “[create] synergy towards 
the effective implementation of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and 
Emergency Response (AADMER) as the common platform for regional disaster 
management.”173 Ratified by all 10 ASEAN member states in 2009, the AADMER offers 
the framework for ASEAN’s HADR responses. The aim to further the AADMER in 
DiREx 2015 signifies ASEAN’s desire to assume centrality within the ARF amidst other 
HADR initiatives and exercises in parallel ASEAN-led institutions such as the EAS and 
ADMM+. Relatedly, Singapore and Malaysia had also highlighted separately that there is 
a need to align priority areas listed in the ARF ISM-DR Work Plan with the AADMER 
work program.174 In the same tone, the United States proposed to convene an ARF 
workshop to focus efforts on “reconciling, creating synergy, and coordination between 
ARF disaster relief exercises throughout the ASEAN mechanisms.”175 Whether these 
initiatives will materialize remains to be seen, but so far, the ARF’s practical cooperation 
in HADR has been promising. While the forum is still unable to mount coordinated 
responses to deliver aids to disaster areas, it has managed to progress beyond dialogues 
and declarations, and organized desktop and field exercises, to foster significant practical 
cooperation amongst member states in disaster relief.  
C. REASONS FOR THE DIFFERENT PACE OF PROGRESS IN COUNTER-
TERRORISM AND HADR  
While ARF members recognized and agreed that there is a need for greater 
cooperation in both counter-terrorism and disaster relief, the forum saw more practical 
cooperation in HADR compared to counter-terrorism. Using the framework proposed in 
Chapter I, this section highlights the different challenges the ARF has faced in furthering 
cooperation in the two NTS domains, and argues that ASEAN states’ reluctance to 
compromise the principle for non-interference resulted in the ARF’s inability for counter-
173  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Thirteeth ASEAN Regional Forum 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief” (Chengdu, China, ASEAN Regional Forum, Feb 26–28, 2014). 
174  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Twelfth ASEAN Regional Forum 




                                                 
terrorism cooperation beyond workshops, and limited intelligence and information 
sharing. Separately, notwithstanding the encouraging signs of increased practical 
cooperation in HADR, the forum fell short of coordinating ARF-centered operational 
responses to disasters. This section argues that states’ concern for infringement of 
sovereignty rights meant that HADR operational responses in the region remained limited 
to bilateral and multilateral coordination amongst trusted partners outside of the ARF’s 
auspices. 
1. Reluctance to Compromise ASEAN Principles for Non-interference in 
State Affairs 
Efforts under the ARF in counter-terrorism were limited to the conduct of 
workshops and seminars because ASEAN states continued to be wary of interference 
from extra-regional states. The 9th ARF ISM-CTTC’s decision that the inclusion of new 
priority areas in counter-terrorism would be allowed, “only if there are lead countries 
from both ASEAN and non-ASEAN ARF participants”176 had been highlighted on 
multiple occasions in different ARF ISMs on CTTC.177 The reminder was put forth in 
2011 when Russia proposed the ISM to tackle issues related to terrorist financing, and 
was again mentioned in 2014 when the EU recommended to add trafficking of human 
beings to the ISM’s agenda. It can be inferred that ASEAN states wanted to maintain 
control over the type of counter-terrorism cooperation in the region and to ensure that this 
cooperation would not infringe the principle for non-interference.  
The reluctance to compromise the principles for non-interference in state affairs 
was most evident in light of some ARF states’ responses to the United States’ 2003 
invasion of Iraq. Some ARF member states feared that the discovery of Islamic terrorist 
cells linked to the Al-Qaeda network in their countries would open the door to similar 
interventions by United States and other extra-regional states. Responding to the United 
176  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Twelfth ASEAN Regional Forum 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime” (Bali, Indonesia, ASEAN 
Regional Forum, Apr 14–16, 2014). 
177  ASEAN Regional Forum, Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Seventh ASEAN Regional Forum 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime; ASEAN Regional Forum, Co-
Chairs’ Summary Report of the Ninth ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-
Terrorism and Transnational Crime. 
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States’ invasion of Iraq with neither the mandate of the UN Security Council nor 
“convincing evidences for the claim of WMD that served as its pretext,”178 Indonesia and 
Malaysia released strongly worded statements deploring the act as “an action of a 
cowardly, imperialist bully”179 and “praised the Iraqi people for their ‘heroic dedication’ 
in defending their nation against U.S.-led invasion.”180 Malaysia and Indonesia have also 
cautioned against associating terrorist networks with specific races and religions. In the 
2011 ARF ISM-CTTC, Malaysia, in its capacity as the co-chair, highlighted that 
“terrorism should not be associated with a particular ethnicity, nationality or religion.”181 
In so doing, states with a predominantly Muslim population, such as Malaysia and 
Indonesia, were wary of plausible intervention that in turn would result in political 
backlash from domestic constituents.  
States’ lack of mutual trust rooted in concerns over external interferences can also 
be inferred from the the ISM-CTTC’s reluctance to endorse initiatives to further 
intelligence and information sharing. Despite acknowledgement that “ARF should 
enhance cooperation in information and intelligence sharing,”182 the forum could not 
agree on actual concrete measures. In the 2010 ISM-CTTC, the United States put forth 
proposals to establish the ARF Transnational Threat Information-Sharing Center 
(ATTIC) and ARF Mutual Legal Assistance Task Force.183 In 2012, the United States 
again recommended to convene “workshops on the concept development of the 
ATTIC.”184 The United States argued that the setting up of the ATTIC and the ARF Task 
Force was aimed at “deepening information sharing arrangements in line with the Hanoi 
178  Morada, “ASEAN Regional Forum and Counter-Terrorism,” 154. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid., 155. 
181  ASEAN Regional Forum, Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Ninth ASEAN Regional Forum 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime 
182  ASEAN Regional Forum, “ASEAN Regional Forum. “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Tenth 
ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime.” (Quang 
Nam, Vietnam, ASEAN Regional Forum, Mar 16–17, 2012). 
183  ASEAN Regional Forum, Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Eighth ASEAN Regional Forum 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime. 
184  ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Regional Forum. “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Tenth 
ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime.  
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PoA to implement the ARF vision statement.”185 Implementation of these initiatives, 
however, remain to be seen. ARF members have since dropped discussion on the ARF 
task force in subsequent ISMs following lackluster responses; discussions on the ATTIC 
are still ongoing. States’ apprehension for legalized and binding agreements in 
information sharing was suitably summed up in the 2006 ISM-CTTC statement, which 
states that “information sharing needs to be done on a reciprocal basis within the limits of 
the domestic legislation and regulation of a particular country.”186 In sum, while states 
have repeatedly voiced a willingness to share intelligence and information in the fight 
against terrorism, the ARF has not seen any comprehensive measures in that regard 
because states continue to harbor mutual suspicious.  
2. Concerns over Plausible Infringement of Sovereignty Rights 
Despite the expansion in scope for practical cooperation in HADR from dialogues 
and workshops to FTXs in DiREX 2011 and 2013, the ARF still lacks the ability to 
coordinate operational responses to deliver aid to disaster struck areas. The inability to 
further HADR cooperation, unlike the case for counter-terrorism, however, is not an issue 
of capacity. In fact, many ARF member states have troops that are well equipped and 
experienced in HADR. Rather, the forum’s inability can be attributed to states’ concerns 
over plausible infringement of sovereignty rights.  
ARF member states’ concerns for “national sovereignty and domestic legislative 
issues in the use of foreign military assets”187 were evident from lackluster responses to 
the United States’ proposal for an ARF Rapid Disaster Response Agreement (RDR). The 
U.S.-proposed agreement asked members to consider an agreement to “allow military 
assets to conduct rapid disaster response operations until such time as the domestic 
185  ASEAN Regional Forum, Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Ninth ASEAN Regional Forum 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime. 
186  ASEAN Regional Forum, “ASEAN Regional Forum. “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Fourth 
ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime.” 
(Beijing, China, ASEAN Regional Forum, Apr 26–28, 2006). 
187  ASEAN Regional Forum, Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Eleventh ASEAN Regional Forum 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief. 
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government and NGO assets could effectively respond to the disaster.”188 To some states, 
this translates into a blanket agreement to allow foreign military troops into sovereign 
territory. In response, some states cited the non-binding ARF Voluntary Model 
Arrangement for Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defense Assets (MCDA). These 
states highlighted that disaster relief assistance should follow the MCDA’s stipulations, 
which calls for “bilateral arrangement between ARF participants on a voluntary basis.”189 
In essence, ARF member states remained uncomfortable with agreements, either 
temporary or permanent, that allow foreign militaries to enter state territory without 
explicit prior approval.   
During the series of ARF seminars on the Laws and Regulations of Disaster 
Relief conducted since 2009, member states again indicated their discomfort with 
allowing foreign militaries to enter a member states’ sovereign territory without receiving 
prior approval from that member. The seminars were seemingly conducted in response to 
Myanmar’s resistance to “admit foreign military assets to speed up humanitarian relief 
effort”190 during the 2008 Cyclone Nargis. The 2009 seminar noted that “in some 
countries, the militaries were the main institution while, in others, it was the civil 
agencies that took the lead, with the militaries playing a supporting and complementary 
role.”191 In addition, the seminar also noted that “external assistance shall be provided 
with the consent of the affected country, and the HADR efforts should be under its 
overall control and supervision.”192 Subsequent seminars in 2010 and 2012 repeated the 
same lines, noting “it is critical to remove all legal obstacles in international HADR 
operations to expedite deployment of relief assistance”193 but accepted that “a standard 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid. 
190  Haacke, “ASEAN Regional Forum and Transnational Challenges,” 144. 
191  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the ASEAN Regional Forum Seminar 
on Laws and Regulations on the Participation in International Disaster Relief by Armed Forces ” (Beijing, 
China, ASEAN Regional Forum, Apr 22–25, 2009). 
192 Ibid. 
193  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Third ASEAN Regional Forum 
Seminar on Laws and Regulations on the Participation in International Disaster Relief by Armed Forces” 
(Beijing, China, ASEAN Regional Forum, Jun 11, 2012). 
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multilateral agreement might not be appropriate to the national legal framework of each 
individual country.”194 Nevertheless, the seminars remained unable to foster consensus to 




                                                 
IV. THE LIMITS OF THE ARF 
The 1995 ARF concept paper identified three key phases—confidence-building, 
PD, and CR—through which the forum should be expected to progress. After 20 years, 
however, the ARF has arguably not been able to progress beyond the confidence-building 
phase. Chapters II and III of this thesis analyzed the ARF’s roles, or lack thereof, in 
managing the region’s traditional security and NTS challenges. These chapters also 
provided explanations for the ARF’s inability to manage and resolve traditional security 
challenges such as the SCS maritime territorial dispute, and its limitations in facilitating 
practical cooperation in the NTS areas of counterterrorism and HADR. This concluding 
chapter matches empirical findings in these chapters to the proposed hypothesis 
highlighted in Chapter I. It argues that the ARF can be reasonably expected to effectively 
tackle security challenges only if the two conditions—maintenance of ASEAN core 
principles and alignment of members’ (critically, great powers’) interests—are fulfilled. 
The first part maps findings in Chapters II and III to the proposed hypothesis. The second 
part then highlights significant headway made by other ALIs, such as the ASEAN 
Defense Minister Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), in tackling NTS challenges, and 
concludes the thesis by arguing that in order for the ARF to maintain its position of 
centrality as Asia’s inclusive security forum, members should be cognizant of the 
forum’s limits and work within these confines. As a continual process of confidence-
building amongst its broad geographical membership, the ARF should align its efforts 
with other ALIs to further practical cooperation in the respective NTS domains.  
A. MAPPING EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES TO HYPOTHESIS 
Chapter I laid out the hypothesis that the ARF’s ability to effectively tackle 
security challenges is premised on the fulfillment of two conditions—that ASEAN core 
principles can be maintained and members’ (critically, great powers’) interests are 
aligned. The ARF had not been able to manage or resolve the SCS maritime territorial 
dispute because these two necessary conditions were not fulfilled. First, the ARF’s active 
management of the dispute would entail intervening in states’ affair, which is a key 
 53 
ASEAN principle. Second, divergent interests between the United States and China, and 
amongst ASEAN claimants, prevented the establishing of consensus. Consequently, the 
ARF could not progress beyond dialogue and issuance of statements.  
On the other hand, the ARF managed to foster limited practical cooperation in 
counter-terrorism and HADR because cooperation in these areas did not infringe ASEAN 
core principles, and members’ interests were broadly aligned. With these two conditions 
fulfilled, the ARF saw progress beyond dialogues and declarations in these areas to 
include the conduct of workshops, seminars, and field training exercises. 
Notwithstanding the significant progress, ARF members remained unable to mount 
coordinated operational responses under the ARF’s auspices in these NTS domains 
because of a lack of trust amongst member states. Table 4 correlates the conditions laid 
out in the hypothesis with empirical findings from Chapters II and III. 
 Correlation of hypothesis with empirical evidence Table 4.  




Case Studies SCS Maritime Territorial Dispute Counterterrorism HADR 
Can the ARF maintain 
ASEAN core 




 Yes Yes 
Are members’ 
interests aligned in 
tackling the security 
challenge? 
No Yes Yes 
Was the ARF able to 
progress beyond 
dialogues and 
declarations in the 
security challenge? 
No 
Yes, but limited to 
workshops and 
seminars 
Yes, but limited to 
practical cooperation 




1. ARF’s Limited Utility in the SCS Dispute 
Pertaining to the SCS dispute, the ARF has been unable to progress beyond 
dialogues and declarations. While the ARF in itself was not able to manage or resolve the 
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SCS dispute, the forum had arguably exhibited limited utility in concert with other 
regional institutions in discouraging states from further escalatory behaviors in the SCS. 
To this end, there have been limited initiatives and agreements concluded outside of the 
ARF, most notably by ASEAN. These agreements encouraged self-restraint from 
claimants and signified at least the willingness of claimant states to negotiate the 
maritime dispute without compulsion and the use of force. Amongst these, ASEAN had 
advocated for “dialogue and consultation among parties”195 to prevent inadvertent 
escalations. Discussions between China and ASEAN concluded a number of mutual 
agreements, such as the aforementioned DOC, which called for “voluntary restraint on 
activities that would cause tension and for consultation and negotiation rather than 
coercion to resolve disputes.”196 In 2011, China and ASEAN also agreed on the 
Guidelines to Implement the DOC.197 Discussions on the implementation of the 
guidelines commenced between China and ASEAN in 2012. Four expert committees on 
maritime scientific research, environmental protection, search and rescue, and 
transnational crime were set up to further initiatives in these areas.198 In addition, 
ASEAN released its “Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea”199 in July 2012 to 
articulate the association’s positions based on ASEAN norms. The document reinforced 
ASEAN’s prior commitment to implement the DOC, and to continue the exercise of self-
restraint and non-use of force in the dispute.200 Relatedly, Indonesia also exercised 
initiative in circulating the zero draft of a regional Code of Conduct (COC) in the 2012 
ASEAN ministers meeting. Indonesian diplomats based the proposal on prior documents 
such as the DOC and ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles. In 2013, ASEAN and China 
commenced official discussions on the COC, and the meeting endorsed an expert group 
195  Thayer, “ASEAN, China, and the Code,” 77.  
196  Jeffery Bader, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael McDevitt, “Keeping the South China Sea in 
Perspective,” Brookings: The Foreign Policy Brief (August 2014): 4.   
197  Thayer, “ASEAN, China, and the Code,” 77.   
198 Ibid.  
199 Ibid., 79.  
200 Ibid.  
 55 
                                                 
to develop the COC.201 Progress on the COC is, however, expected to be long-drawn 
because of claimants’ different interpretations of sovereignty rights and unwillingness to 
relent on their separate claims.  
More recently, during the slew of meetings between Asia–Pacific leaders in 
November 2014, states also adopted conciliatory stances in discussing the maritime 
dispute. During the 12th ASEAN–China meeting, China stated that the dispute would be 
addressed “through friendly consultations and negotiations and in a peaceful way.”202 
China’s leader also dedicated a long speech during the G20 conference to address the 
dispute, stating “it is China’s longstanding position to address peacefully its disputes with 
countries concerned and territorial sovereignty and maritime interest through dialogue 
and consultation.”203 In a meeting between China and Malaysia’s leaders during APEC, 
China also praised Malaysia for “adopting the quiet diplomacy approach in tackling 
maritime disputes in the SCS.”204 Reciprocating the conciliatory gesture on the sidelines 
of the APEC meeting, the Philippines leader stated “[on] most of the general points [in 
discussions related to the dispute], we had a meeting of the minds.”205 While the 
positive-spirited statements suggested a shift towards more moderate overtures, the 
rhetoric in leader’s statements itself does not guarantee that the conflicting claims in the 
dispute would be kept below its simmering point. The situation in the SCS remains 
volatile, and tensions can be easily reignited should states engage in unilateral assertions 
seeking to alter the status quo.  
201 Ibid., 82.  
202  People’s Daily Online, “China Insists on ‘Dual-Track’ Approach to Resolving South China Sea 
Issues,” November 18, 2014, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/1118/c98649-8810382.html.   
203  Michelle Florcruz, “South China Sea Maritime Dispute: Xi Jinping Vows Peaceful Resolution, as 
PLA Prepares for Possible Use of Force,” International Business Times, November 17, 2014, 
http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-maritime-dispute-xi-jinping-vows-peaceful-resolution-pla-
prepares-1724819.   
204  “China’s Xi Praises Malaysia’s ‘Quiet Diplomacy’ on South China Sea Issues,” Channel 
NewsAsia, November 18, 2014, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/china-s-xi-praises/
1465796.html.   
205  Benjamin Kang Lim, “Beijing, Philippines Move to Calm South China Sea Tensions,” Reuters, 
November 11, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/11/china-apec-philippines-
idUSL3N0T11OQ20141111.   
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Empirical evidence cited in Chapter II has shown that the ARF had not been able 
to manage, let alone resolve the SCS territorial dispute. The ARF, led by ASEAN and 
modeled on the basis of the “ASEAN way,” is loosely institutionalized as an inclusive 
forum. Being ASEAN-led, the reluctance of ASEAN to compromise the principle of non-
interference in state affairs meant that the forum could not intercede when members 
undertook unilateral actions that have, at times, escalated tensions in the SCS. The 
absence of securitization in the ARF owing to its large membership base and 
correspondingly, its members’ widely divergent interests, also meant that it has been very 
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve consensus in dealing with zero-sum traditional 
security issues such as the SCS maritime dispute, where one states’ gain is another state’s 
loss. Consequently, in traditional security issues such as the SCS maritime dispute, the 
ARF could not progress beyond dialogues and declarations, and remains a high-level talk 
shop that can only manage the issuance of statements to encourage states restraint.  
2. Limited Counter-Terrorism and HADR Practical Cooperation under 
ARF’s Auspices 
Notwithstanding the progress made by the ARF to foster regional cooperation in 
counter-terrorism and HADR, operational responses have remained largely bilateral and 
multilateral outside of the ARF’s auspices. Instances in which intelligence exchanges 
contributed to counter-terrorism have been confined to voluntary exchanges amongst 
willing states, most notably between the United States and ASEAN states. For instance, 
the intelligence exchanges between relevant ASEAN states led to the arrest of Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) operatives such as leader Mas Selamat Kastari and explosives expert 
Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi in Singapore and the Philippines, respectively.206 Similarly, 
Malaysia and Singapore’s provision of video testimonies by JI operatives residing in their 
respective states during the trial of JI spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Bashir was a trilateral 
cooperation outside of the ARF.207 On the same note, the United States–led multilateral 
proliferation security initiative (PSI) occurred outside of the ARF; it was the strong 
206  Tan See Seng and Kumar Ramakrishnan, “Interstate and Intrastate Dynamics in Southeast Asia’s 
War on Terror,” SAIS Review 24, no. 1 (2004): 94–5. 
207 Ibid. 
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bilateral alliances between the United States and key Southeast Asian countries that led to 
the successful interdiction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other terrorism-
related paraphernalia.208  
HADR operational responses have also been confined largely to bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation outside of the ARF. Just as it had been in the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami, where the “makeshift coalition of the United States, Japan, Australia, and 
India—known as the Tsunami Core Group (TCG)”209 was instrumental in coordinating 
aid delivery to disaster areas, operational responses to recent calamities such as the 2008 
Cyclone Nargis and the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan were conducted outside of the ARF. 
Occurring hours after the inaugural ARF HADR desktop exercise in Jakarta, Myanmar’s 
junta government rejected all forms of foreign assistance. It was ASEAN that coordinated 
relief efforts in Myanmar. Through deployment of the ASEAN Emergency Rapid 
Assessment Team (ERAT), the association assessed the population needs before 
facilitating “the effective distribution and utilization of assistance from the international 
community, including the expeditious and effective deployment of relief workers.”210 
Despite ASEAN’s facilitation, Myanmar’s government rejected propositions for foreign 
military assets, including those from Southeast Asia, to assist in disaster relief.  
Relief efforts during the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan were similarly relegated to 
bilateral initiatives, outside of ARF, and even ASEAN auspices. Despite the prior 
conduct of large scale DiRExs in 2011 and 2013, there was an evident absence of disaster 
relief coordination through the ARF. Singapore’s deployment of C-130 transport planes 
to deliver relief supplies, Brunei’s deployment of a patrol vessel and fixed wing aircraft, 
and Indonesia and Thailand’s contribution of air assets and medical supplies were all 
conducted on a bilateral basis.211 Similarly, Japan’s Self Defense Forces’ (SDF) assets, 
208  Cha, “Complex Patchworks,” 43. 
209 Ibid., 37. 
210  Haacke, “ASEAN Regional Forum and Transnational Challenges,” 144. 
211  Euan Graham, “Super Typhoon Haiyan: ASEAN’s Katrina Moment?” RSIS Commentaries, no. 
213 (November 23, 2013). 
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including some “1100 personnel, 16 military aircraft, and three ships”212 could only 
deploy after the Philippines “formally requested”213 them. Unlike the case of Cyclone 
Nargis, the Philippines did not resist foreign military aid. The troubling issue, however, is 
that despite prior exercises to practice regional HADR responses, disaster relief efforts 
remained slow and uncoordinated.  
Unlike traditional security issues such as the SCS maritime territorial dispute, 
NTS challenges are not zero-sum, generally do not contravene the ASEAN principle of 
non-interference, and are broadly aligned with great powers’ interests. Despite this, the 
respective ARF ISMs only managed to foster limited practical cooperation under the 
ARF’s auspices to tackle NTS challenges such as counter-terrorism and HADR. While 
the ARF was able to progress in these areas beyond dialogues and declarations to see the 
conduct of the aforementioned counter-terrorism workshops and HADR desktop and field 
exercises, it was not able to influence member states to agree on operational cooperative 
initiatives, such as the U.S.-proposed ATTIC, ARF Mutual Legal Assistance Task Force, 
and the ARF RDR.  
The ARF’s inability to advance operational cooperation in NTS can be attributed 
to a lack of mutual trust amongst all members, the forum’s strict adherence to consensus, 
and members’ averseness to binding arrangements. The lack of mutual trust limited 
counter-terrorism cooperation to voluntary information sharing amongst willing states 
with existing defense arrangements, most notably between the United States and its 
defense partners in Asia. Being an ASEAN-led forum, the ARF abides by the principles 
of consensus and is averse to binding arrangements. Not all members are comfortable 
with the trans-boundary deployment of military assets for HADR. While some activist 
members are keen to conclude arrangements such as the RDR, others remain wary that 
acceding to these binding agreements equates to granting uncontrolled access to foreign 
militaries. Consequently, consensus could not be reached in the forum, and significant 
operational cooperation in HADR remained bilateral and multilateral outside of the 




                                                 
B. CONCLUSION: CENTERING EFFORTS TO FOSTER PRACTICAL 
COOPERATION IN THE NTS DOMAIN 
In the last two decades, Asia has seen the sprouting of new security institutions, 
such as the Shangri-La Dialogue, the ADMM, and the ADMM-Plus, which to a certain 
extent, had enhanced the existing security architecture in the region. Some of these, such 
as the ADMM-Plus, have made significant headways in fostering practical cooperation 
amongst members. In addition, traditional security matters such as the SCS dispute have 
also crept into the agenda of economic-focused forums such as the East Asia Summit 
(EAS) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). This begs the question of 
whether regional states and the great powers still believe in the ARF’s relevance in 
tackling the region’s security challenges.  
1. Parallel NTS Initiatives by ADMM-Plus 
Conceived in 2007, the ADMM-Plus is an expanded grouping of the ADMM, 
which brings together defense officials from ASEAN’s eight extra-regional dialogue 
members, including Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Russia, 
and the United States. With the concept approved in the second ADMM held in 
Singapore in 2007, the ADMM-Plus held its inaugural meeting in 2010. Different from 
the ARF, the ADMM-Plus focuses primarily on practical cooperation in NTS issues such 
as “natural disasters, pandemics, and the security implications of climate change and 
environmental deterioration.”214 Deliberate in its efforts to not be relegated into another 
talk shop forum, the ADMM-Plus instituted Expert Working Groups (EWGs) to discuss 
and further practical approaches to tackle various NTS challenges in the region. Five 
EWGs on the areas of HADR, maritime security, peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and 
military medicine were established, with each EWG co-chaired by an ASEAN member 
and an extra-regional dialogue partner.  
So far, the ADMM-Plus has organized a significant number of exercises to foster 
practical security cooperation amongst members in NTS areas. Separate tabletop 
214  Desmond Ball, “Reflections on Defence Security in East Asia,” RSIS Working Paper 237, 
Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang 
Technological University, Singapore, 2012, 17. 
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exercises on military medicine and maritime security were organized in 2012 by the 
respective EWGs. In 2013, a large scale HADR and military medicine exercise was 
conducted in Brunei. Different from the ARF DiREXs, which typically featured civil–
military cooperation, the ADMM-Plus exercise focused on military to military 
cooperation.215 Some “3200 personnel, seven ships, and 15 helicopters,” including “a 
cargo ship by the U.S. Navy . . . a hospital ship by China, as well as more than 300 troops 
by Japan”216 were deployed.217 In the same year, the ADMM-Plus also conducted a 
counterterrorism exercise (CTX) in Sentul, Indonesia, as well as a maritime security field 
training exercise in Sydney, Australia. In 2014, a tabletop exercise on peacekeeping was 
also conducted in Manila, Philippines. Practical cooperation under the ADMM-Plus have 
matched, and arguably exceeded, the scale and scope of those conducted under the ARF’s 
auspices. The ADMM-Plus, however, faced the same challenges as the ARF, with a 
general inability to mount coordinated operational responses to the region’s NTS 
challenges. Notwithstanding this, members’ willingness to participate in the 
aforementioned exercises signaled readiness to progress beyond mere dialogues and 
declarations towards practical security cooperation in these NTS domains. It is therefore 
appropriate that regional institutions such as the ARF and other security-focused ALIs 
such as the ADMM-Plus focus confidence-building measures along these NTS domains. 
2. Can the ARF Maintain Its Position of Centrality as an Inclusive 
Regional Security Institution?  
Instead of following the footsteps of ARF critics and advocates, who held distinct 
interpretations of the ARF’s objectives and, correspondingly, used different yardsticks to 
assess the forum’s effectiveness and relevance, this thesis approached analysis of the 
ARF by examining the forum’s limits and offered reasons for these limitations. Rather 
than making extreme arguments that led to the concluding of the ARF as either an 
ineffective talk shop or a norm-shaping forum, it laid out the conditions that are 
215  Tomotaka Shoji, “ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus: A Japanese 
Perspective,” NIDS Journal of Defense and Security, no. 14 (December 2014): 13.  
216  Ibid. 
217  Ibid. 
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necessary for the forum to progress security issues beyond dialogues and declarations, 
and tested them against the forum’s approaches to specific traditional security and NTS 
challenges. The thesis found that there was insufficient evidence to prove ARF 
advocates’ claims regarding the existence of a regional social norm that would constrain 
states from engaging in assertive behaviors. The ARF, like other regional institutions that 
operate based on a cooperative security framework, was not able to manage and resolve 
the region’s traditional security issues. In this regard, the ARF has fallen short of ARF 
advocates’ claims. This handicap, however, does not necessarily mean that the ARF is an 
ineffective talk shop, as claimed by ARF critics. To this end, the ARF had fostered 
significant practical security cooperation in the NTS areas of counter-terrorism and 
HADR.  
The ARF was formulated post–Cold War to engage great powers in the region so 
as to afford a stable security complex for economic progress. For the ARF to maintain its 
position as the central security forum in the region, member states, and more importantly, 
ASEAN as the organization that leads the forum, need to be cognizant of the forum’s 
limits and formulate realistic objectives within these confines. Specifically, the ARF 
should continue and, if possible, synergize with parallel ALIs in the conduct of 
multilateral exercises within the NTS domains. While these exercises fall short of 
operational coordination in responding to the actual NTS challenges, frequent exchanges 
in these areas promote state-to-state interaction and contribute to the forum’s confidence-
building framework.  
There are reasons to be sanguine about the ARF’s continued relevance. When 
ASEAN initiated the forum in 1997, it had not envisioned that member states with 
divergent interests would be able to come together in large-scale joint exercises to 
address the region’s security challenges. The ARF has since evolved from a talk shop that 
was only capable of dialogues and declarations, to one that has fostered increased 
practical cooperation to tackle specific NTS challenges. To this end, the ARF is slated to 
conduct the “first iteration of its major disaster relief exercise (DiREx 2015),”218 which 
218  Prashanth Parameswaran, “ASEAN Eyes Closer Military Ties in 2015,” Diplomat, February 12, 
2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/asean-eyes-closer-military-ties-in-2015/. 
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has the laudable objective of “implementing the AADMER as the common platform for 
regional disaster management.”219 Separately, the ARF has also spurred the creation of 
other institutions such as the ADMM-Plus, whose effort to promote military-to-military 
exchanges was praiseworthy. The ADMM-Plus’s EWGs have started planning for the 
combined field training exercise on maritime security and counter-terrorism to be 
conducted in 2016.220 In addition to these increased cooperation, the year 2015 marks the 
dateline for ASEAN to bring the idea of the ASEAN community to fruition, with the 
ASEAN Political-Security community as one of the community’s three pillars. All these 
point to regional and extra-regional states’ willingness to deepen security cooperation 
within the confines of NTS. Although some of these initiatives fall outside of the ARF’s 
auspice, the forum, recognized as the most inclusive security institution in the region, 
could leverage on the opportunity to coordinate activities with parallel ALIs to concretize 
its position of centrality and relevance.   
219  ASEAN Regional Forum, “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Thirteeth ASEAN Regional Forum 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief” (Chengdu, China, ASEAN Regional Forum, Feb 26–28, 2014). 
220  Parameswaran, “ASEAN Eyes Closer.” 
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